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**COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT FOR COLLECTIVE
RESILIENCE: THE RISING SYSTEM**

by

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September 2012

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**COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT FOR COLLECTIVE RESILIENCE: THE
RISING SYSTEM**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

Since the inception of the United States Department of Homeland Security, the American public has been told that it has a prominent role to play in the “War on Terror.” However, this role has not been clearly defined. This thesis explores the viability of community engagement as a tool to promote public safety and homeland security. Research was primarily conducted through a literature review (to understand how engagement impacts safety), and a comparison of four case studies of safety-centric engagement programs in the U.S. and United Kingdom. While several of the programs in the case studies have proven to be effective at developing trust and improving security, the U.S. federal government has not effectively worked with these resources to improve its understanding of the domestic security landscape. This thesis contends that a new system is necessary to connect the federal government to local engagement programs. This may be accomplished with a domestic coordination and engagement system, referred to as the “Rising System” for the purposes of this thesis. The goal of the Rising System would be threefold: To link federal, state, and local governments; to build on existing community policing and outreach efforts to help at-risk communities identify their greatest challenges; and to provide a forum where community members can safely work with their government to develop solutions.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BCOT	Building Communities of Trust
CAPS	Chicago's Alternative Policing Strategy
CCI	Creating the Conditions for Integration
CDC	Center for Disease Control
CRCL	Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOJ	Department of Justice
ELP	Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FISA	Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
LAPD	Los Angeles Police Department
PPD	Philadelphia Police Department
PSA	Police Service Area
ROOCC	Regional Outreach and Operations Coordination Center
SIP	Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States
UK	United Kingdom
U.S.	United States
USAO	Offices of the U.S. Attorneys

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I. INTRODUCTION

There is nothing more dangerous than to build a society with a large segment of people in that society who feel that they have no stake in it; who feel that that have nothing to lose. People who have stake in their society, protect that society, but when they don't have it, they unconsciously want to destroy it.

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

Since the inception of the United States Department of Homeland Security, the American public has been told that it has a prominent role to play in the “War on Terror.” National security, homeland security, and counterterrorism strategy documents released in 2002, 2007, 2010, and 2011¹ have treated the role of the individual American citizen in different contexts, but each document is based on the idea that while government action can achieve some successes in our collective defense, the engagement of individuals and communities is imperative to providing for a homeland that is truly secure. One of these documents, the *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* (2011) describes a need to “assist, engage, and connect communities to increase their collective resilience.”² However, the role of the community has not been clearly defined.

This thesis explored the notion of community engagement, particularly in the context of how outreach may be effectively coordinated by the federal government. The initial research (found in the literature review) focused on determining the effectiveness

¹ See: Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, (2002), Homeland Security Council, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, (2007), Office of the President of the United States, *National Security Strategy*, (2010), US Department of Homeland Security, *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland*, (2010), Office of the President of the United States, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* (June 2011), and , Office of the President of the United States, *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (August 2011), and Office of the President of the United States, *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (December 2011).

² Office of the President of the United States, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* (June 2011), 10.

of community engagement as a public safety tool. The research concluded that for a variety of reasons, engaging communities can make them more resilient, both from a public safety and homeland security perspective.

With the effectiveness of engagement established, the research shifted to analyzing existing citizen engagement programs that have proven to be successful in various ways. Three such programs were conducted by municipal governments in the U.S., and a fourth was the counterterrorism strategy of the United Kingdom, *Prevent*. These cases have three commonalities in their strategies that contribute to their success: how they defined the community to be engaged, the tactics they used to engage residents, and how they allocate funding and resources.

The knowledge gained from the literature review and case studies was then applied to the primary contribution of this thesis, a proposal for a U.S. federal engagement strategy, here called the “Rising System.” The strategy behind the Rising System is based on consolidating responsibility for federal engagement activities, and then providing liaisons to interact with local engagement activities already in place throughout the U.S. By utilizing existing engagement programs, the Rising System allows the federal government to benefit from the trust already established by local governments with their communities, often through community policing efforts.

The Rising System is also based in the idea that by listening to the public and engaging in activities that present an opportunity for bi-directional information flow, the federal government will gain insight to local communities that facilitates more effective service delivery. The role of the public in this model is to speak with the government, and participate in discussions on both a tactical and policy level about safety and security in their communities. The Rising System provides a vehicle to begin these conversations.

A. PROBLEM SPACE

There are myriad of ways to describe a “community.” Communities may be geographic areas, ethnic groups, interest groups, extended families, or those sharing

socioeconomic characteristics.³ Therefore, guidance from the United States (U.S.) federal government on “community participation” and involvement, as found in several national strategy and homeland security documents,⁴ is vague.

Despite which criteria are used to describe a community, some communities are evaluated to be at higher risk for public safety and homeland security issues than others.⁵ Underserved communities, those with high levels of crime, poor quality of life, and limited access to government services, are among those that may be considered “high-risk.” They are similar to communities described by Nolan, Conti, and McDevitt as “anomie.”⁶ These communities are the least likely to: be self-sufficient; be prepared to prevent or respond to homeland security issues ranging from domestic radicalization to large-scale emergency response; be informed about available public services; or trust government.⁷ Residents who find themselves not receiving their “fair share” of government services may also be more likely to take violent actions against their government and society.⁸

Engagement, the active solicitation of community members to participate in government decision-making processes, can serve as a tool to improve governments’ understanding of these high-risk communities, and to improve their relationship with

³ Athol Yates, “Community involvement in national security: An essential but difficult task,” *National Security Practice Notes* (August 2005), accessed July 16, 2011, http://www.homelandsecurity.org.au/files/NSPN_Community_engagement.pdf.

⁴ See: Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, (2002), Homeland Security Council, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, (2007), Office of the President of the United States, *National Security Strategy*, (2010), US Department of Homeland Security, *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland*, (2010), Office of the President of the United States, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* (June 2011), Office of the President of the United States, *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (August 2011), and Office of the President of the United States, *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (December 2011).

⁵ Nolan, J., Conti, N., and McDevitt, J. “Situational Policing: Neighbourhood Development and Crime Control.” *Policing & Society*, 14, 2 (June 2004), 99–117.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Robert Bach and David J. Kaufman, “A Social Infrastructure for Hometown Security: Advancing the Homeland Security Paradigm,” *Homeland Security Affairs*, V, No.2 (May 2009), accessed July 10, 2011, <https://www.hSDL.org/?view&doc=109866&coll=limited>.

⁸ Fathali M. Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International), 2006.

residents. Several municipalities across the U.S. and abroad have effectively used engagement to develop grass-roots strategies that improved quality of life and security.

While the U.S. federal government recognizes engagement as an important aspect of homeland security,⁹ the government provides little effective guidance on how that engagement should take place, or who should be responsible for the engagement. This thesis proposes that if the federal government uses successful local engagement models to build trust with communities, residents will respond by taking greater ownership of the areas around their homes, with the potential to improve both their quality of life and public safety.¹⁰ Once communities achieve an improved collective efficacy,¹¹ they should have developed a trusting relationship with (at least) their local government, if not their state and federal counterparts. Communities should understand how to access services critical to improving their neighborhood, and gradually see an increase in quality of life as they actively participate to improve their neighborhood and shed the label “underserved.” Communities that accomplish these goals may be safer and more vibrant, and the government will enjoy a more thorough knowledge and appreciation of the dynamics of the neighborhood. This thesis proposes that appropriate government engagement strategies can provide the vehicle to creating more “strong” (low crime, high efficacy) communities. This thesis explores the qualities, benefits, and some models of engagement, and recommends an engagement strategy for the U.S. federal government.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

How can homeland security practitioners leverage what is known about local citizen engagement to improve federal outreach in a way that makes communities safer?

1. How can engagement be used to build resilience and trust?

⁹ Office of the President of the United States *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (August 2011) and Office of the President of the United States, *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (December 2011).

¹⁰ Nolan, et al., “Situational Policing.”

¹¹ As defined by Nolan, et al., “the cohesion among residents combined with shared expectations for the social control of public space.”

2. With limited resources, engagement strategies must be focused on areas where they will have the most significant impact. How can the government identify areas that are high-risk for crime or terrorism?
3. What specialties or resources are needed to conduct an effective engagement process?
4. What aspects of engagement might help counter the terrorist narrative preventing individuals from becoming involved in terrorist organizations?
5. How can engagement change the behavior of potentially dangerous individuals?

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review conducted for this thesis examined research surrounding some of the underlying concepts described in the research questions and problem space. The review is divided into three sections: “What We Might Know,” “What We Haven’t Figured Out Yet,” and “What We Need to Know.” “What We Might Know” explores the difficulties of defining the term “community,” examines the role some governments have taken in engagement activities, discusses the impact that engagement can have on communities, and reviews some of the U.S. federal government’s existing engagement operations. The literature in “What We Haven’t Figured Out Yet” discusses the importance of establishing “social trust,”¹² and how that can be facilitated through the development of strategies that empower bottom-up decision making and by enhancing what social psychologists refer to as procedural justice. The “What We Need to Know” category explores gaps in U.S. federal engagement processes, and the lack of a comprehensive engagement strategy.

1. What We Might Know

Throughout the literature reviewed for this thesis, the definition of “resilience” is generally accepted as the ability of a community to withstand and recover from disruptive

¹² As described in Robert Bach, Robert Doran, Laura Gibb, David Kaufman, and Kathy Settle, “Policy Challenges in Supporting Community Resilience,” presented initially at the London Workshop of the Multinational Community Resilience Policy Group (2010), accessed July 10, 2011, <http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=4563>, 23.

events.¹³ Resilience is consistently seen as an important quality for communities to possess. Communities with this quality are understood to be better prepared to respond to an emergency, and to recover faster after disaster strikes.¹⁴

How, then, do communities become resilient? The literature reveals that resiliency is the product of several factors, including location, economic standing, and available resources.¹⁵ However, one factor has stood prominently in several U.S. national security and counterterrorism-focused documents—engagement. The definition of engagement, however, varies considerably, and manifests itself in different ways with different strategies. Engagement strategies reflect the definition of the audience to be engaged, the government’s understanding of its role in the process, and how the engagement itself is conducted. For the works reviewed here, engagement (like resiliency) was viewed universally as a positive action, though opinions on its effectiveness varied. These analyses are discussed further in the “What We Haven’t Figured Out Yet” section. One publication referred to engagement as the “most important element in further enhancing national security.”¹⁶ The details of what engagement entails, however, are frequently left out.

2. Defining “Community”

Discrepancies about strategies for engagement begin with the understanding that the U.S. is composed of a wide variety of communities. The first point to be clarified is the parameter of what defines a community. Communities may be geographic areas, ethnic groups, interest groups, extended families, or those sharing socioeconomic characteristics.¹⁷ Engagement strategies for each of these groups require different tactics.

¹³ Patricia H. Longstaff, Nicholas J. Armstrong, Keli Perrin, Whitney May Parker, and Matthew Hidek, “Building Resilient Communities: A Preliminary Framework for Assessment,” *Homeland Security Affairs*, VI, No.3 (Sept. 2010) 3, accessed July 16, 2011, <https://www.hSDL.org/?view&doc=130533&coll=limited>.

¹⁴ Cabinet Office, *Preparing for Emergencies: Guide for communities* (March 2011). Accessed July 16, 2011, http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/PFE-Guide-for-Communities_0.pdf.

¹⁵ Longstaff, “Building Resilient Communities,” 4.

¹⁶ Yates, “Community Involvement in National Security.”

¹⁷ Ibid.

The literature concludes that no single type of program or initiative will be successful in all of these environments;¹⁸ customized plans will need to be drawn for each community.

Defining the audience to be engaged becomes the first task in creating an engagement program. The City of Philadelphia, for instance, focuses its engagement activities on small, geographically-bound communities. Other programs, like the New York Police Department's Community Affairs Bureau focus on groups based on ethnicity, religion, and sports leagues.¹⁹

3. Conducting Engagement Activities

While simply interacting with the public is a start, studies show that the public has a desire for more meaningful conversations in many communities.²⁰ The first priority of many communities is to feel safe.²¹ Feeling safe and statistically being safe may be interpreted differently. Many cities measure their safety by the number of violent crimes reported through Uniform Crime Reports.²² Feeling safe, however, may not correlate with statistics on being safe. While avoiding direct confrontation with violent crime is an obvious aspect to feeling safe, the impression includes freedom from harassment, nuisances, and street crime.²³ Statistics on safety perception may not be readily available with statistics, but it can be understood by working with residents. Margaret Camina's research indicates that residents are also willing to participate in engagement processes if they believe that officials are listening to them, and that conditions are improving.²⁴ If conducted properly, this can become a self-perpetuating cycle of government listening to

¹⁸ Bach and Kaufman, "A Social Infrastructure for Hometown Security."

¹⁹ Brian Fishman and Andrew Lebovich, "Countering Domestic Radicalization: Lessons for Intelligence Collection and Community Outreach" (New America Foundation: 2011), accessed July 23, 2011, http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/countering_domestic_radicalization.

²⁰ Margaret Camina, *Understanding and Engaging Deprived Communities* (London : Home Office, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, Communication Development Unit, 2004).

²¹ Ibid.

²² For more information, see "FBI – Uniform Crime Reports," *Federal Bureau of Investigation*, accessed July 16, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr>.

²³ Camina, *Understanding and Engaging Deprived Communities*.

²⁴ Ibid.

residents, conditions improving as a result of better information about neighborhoods, and deeper engagement by residents as their communities become more vibrant.

The literature also reveals a number of methods for interaction with community members. Some methods take the approach of traditional “grass-roots” organizations—knocking on doors, sponsoring events, and meeting with existing neighborhood organizations.²⁵ Others take recently developed initiatives and build on them, such as outreach through relationships established in community policing efforts or involving ex-offenders in analyzing gun violence data.²⁶ Metrics to determine which methods are most effective are sparse, and when they do exist, they are often inconsistent. The common theme that emerges from the literature is that the use of outreach methods is necessary, and that each group/community will be different, and thus requires a different approach.²⁷

The work of Nolan, Conti, and McDevitt²⁸ further support the need to customize approaches for communities. The authors suggest that there is a direct correlation between the level of crime in a community and the degree to which members of that community are effectively organized. They place neighborhoods in one of four types—Strong (low crime and high organization), Vulnerable (low crime and low organization), Anomic (high crime and low organization) or Responsive (high crime and high organization).

According to their analysis, tactics for promoting general public safety need to be geared toward moving communities in a positive direction for both factors (lower crime and increase organization). For the community policing process to be effective, those conducting the engagement must first understand the condition of the community before

²⁵ Institute for Law and Justice, “Engaging the Community in Project Safe Neighborhoods” (October 2005), Prepared for the Bureau of Justice Assistance, accessed July 16, 2011, http://www.ilj.org/publications/docs/PSN_CE_Monograph_FINAL.pdf.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Yates, “Community Involvement in National Security.”

²⁸ Nolan, et al., “Situational Policing.”

developing an engagement plan. Once this “community profile” is identified, a customized goal and action plan may be developed to bring the community to the desired level.

In addition to requiring customized plans, the literature notes that engagement should not be restricted to any single type of community, regardless of how the community is defined. Working with communities enhances the situational awareness of authority figures,²⁹ and leaving out any single group could cause a gap in coverage. Research has also shown that communities must be evaluated on many levels to detect patterns—census data has been used to show that some community characteristics can predict neighborhoods’ vulnerability to disasters.³⁰ Community policing has been helpful in conducting such analysis, and through trial-and-error has developed efficiencies for doing so. For instance, efforts in some areas have shown that it is more efficient to work with existing community organizations than to create new ones.³¹

4. The Role of Government

Even when the boundaries (or types) of the community are understood, there are several competing definitions and viewpoints about what the role of government (especially federal) should be in this process. The British government has an extensive strategy for engagement, where it encourages ongoing relationships with the community, and provides clear expectations of the actions it is willing to take to promote engagement.³² In Australian literature there is a focus on directing engagement to interest groups centered on religion, business, professional associations, and academia.³³

²⁹ Samantha L. Magsino, Rapporteur, *Application of Social Network Analysis for Building Community Disaster Resilience: Workshop Summary*, (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2009), accessed July 16, 2011, http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12706.

³⁰ Betty Hearn Morrow, “Community Resilience: A Social Justice Perspective/Community and Regional Resilience Initiative Research Report 4,” *Community and Regional Resilience Initiative* (2008).

³¹ Cabinet Office, *Preparing for Emergencies*.

³² Ibid.

³³ Yates, “Community Involvement in National Security.”

Fishman and Lebovich³⁴ argue that governments should reduce their role in community outreach for counterterrorism purposes. They describe what they see as shortcomings of some programs, such as the Los Angeles Police Department's strategy (at one point deemed "Muslim Mapping" by the media³⁵) and Britain's CONTEST Strategy (especially the Prevent section), as cases where they believe government intervention hurt relationships with at-risk communities more than it strengthened them. The Fishman and Lebovich evaluation does bring up a valid point, that outreach should not be done solely in the context of counterterrorism, but in a wider context to address grievances.³⁶ While the literature reviewed for this paper does not support their recommendation to reduce the government's role in engagement, a federal framework for engagement could at least partially address their point by addressing quality of life issues beyond those that overtly contribute to radicalization.

In the U.S., the federal government has not yet taken a role in large-scale community engagement. While campaigns like Ready.gov have served as useful advertising tools, they have remained one-way paths of communication. Their message often goes unheard, as it is not geared toward the needs of daily life, needs that go unsupported by many government organizations.³⁷ To date, local governments have been able to establish one crucial aspect of a relationship that the federal government has not been able to engender—trust. In many ways, local governments are much better suited to develop trust with their communities, if for no other reason than direct interaction. Bach and Kauffman noted that the approval rating for federal employees increases sharply when they interact with residents during their workday.³⁸ Local officials, then, with more interaction, are likely more predisposed to positive relationships with residents.

³⁴ Fishman and Lebovich, "Countering Domestic Radicalization."

³⁵ Richard Winton, Teresa Watanabe, and Greg Krikorian, "LAPD Defends Muslim Mapping Effort," *Los Angeles Times*, November 10, 2007, accessed April 21, 2012, <http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-lapd10nov10,0,3960843.story>.

³⁶ Fishman and Lebovich, "Countering Domestic Radicalization," 20.

³⁷ Bach et al., "Policy Challenges in Supporting Community Resilience."

³⁸ Bach and Kaufman, "A Social Infrastructure for Hometown Security."

This is also more of a necessity for local civil servants like the police, who have needed to maintain civil relationships for longer periods of time.³⁹

In 2011, the Obama Administration released companion strategy documents specifically directed at violence (particularly terrorism) prevention measures: *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (ELP) and *The Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (SIP). These documents made several broad policy statements, as well as some relatively detailed recommendations for outreach strategies. Among the more fundamental tenants of the documents is the notion federal officials are often “ill-suited” to intervene at a community level. ELP attributes this to the speed of local representatives to identify problems and customize appropriate responses.⁴⁰ ELP goes on to note that local partners should be sought for strategies and ideas.

SIP contains more tangible strategies than the philosophically-driven ELP. It places the primary responsibility for outreach on the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and recommends establishing other outreach offices in departments such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The roles of the federal government in engagement, according to SIP, are to act as a facilitator/convener of engagement discussions, and to support local initiatives (including community policing) with information and grants.⁴¹ While these documents provide some guidance, they have been criticized as lacking specific details,⁴² as well as being “very aspirational.”⁴³

³⁹ Nicole J. Henderson, Christopher W. Ortiz, Naomi F. Sugie, and Joel Miller. *Law Enforcement & Arab American Community Relations after September 11, 2001: Engagement in a Time of Uncertainty*. New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2006, accessed July 16, 2011, <http://www.vera.org/download?file=147/Arab%2BAmerican%2Bcommunity%2Breations.pdf>.

⁴⁰ Office of the President, *Empowering Local Partners*, 3.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Jerome P. Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat*: Congressional Research Service, 2011.

⁴³ Eileen Sullivan, “New White House Strategy to Hit Violent Extremism,” *Associated Press*, August 3, 2011, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hLU4EFgXfCXmXryTs3Z3UpSRO8CA?docId=a159313d96c14cff94e4b5a87bc53730>, as cited in Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism*.

However, the U.S. has several federal agencies already conducting outreach in a manner that seems to attempt to actualize the Obama Administration’s guidance. Much of this outreach has come from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). This remainder of this section will focus on a review of existing federal outreach offices and programs in DHS and DOJ that are designed to prevent violent behaviors, both from a traditional crime-based approach as well as measures to counter violent extremism (CVE).

5. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL)—DHS seems to have developed its engagement program specifically in response to complaints regarding their handling of security issues. DHS has classified a significant portion of engagement activities within the broader context of preserving civil liberties. While the office handles complaints from a range of areas, including abuse of law enforcement powers,⁴⁴ their outreach is far more targeted—they aim to reach “American Arab, Muslim, South Asian, Middle Eastern, and Sikh communities”⁴⁵ in the U.S. In FY2010, outreach was expanded to some Latino and Asian American Communities.⁴⁶ The office has “special” outreach efforts based on issues, as well as an Incident Communication Coordination Team (ICCT) that brings stakeholders from communities and the government to open a

⁴⁴ “DHS Complaints,” *US Department of Homeland Security*, accessed March 12, 2012, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1280776157114.shtm.

⁴⁵ “DHS Community Engagement,” *US Department of Homeland Security*, accessed March 12, 2012, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1273873058706.shtm.

⁴⁶ United States Department of Homeland Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, *Fiscal Year 2010 Annual and Consolidated Quarterly Reports to Congress*, September 20, 2011, 15, <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/crcl-annual-report-fy-2010.pdf>.

dialogue immediately after a terrorist event.⁴⁷ CRCL's outreach is geographically limited to "regular" meetings in thirteen U.S. cities,⁴⁸ a list that excludes seven of the ten largest U.S. cities by population.⁴⁹

Assessment of CRCL is difficult, as little has been published on the office's engagement beyond strategy documents and lists of outputs (e.g., number of roundtables held⁵⁰). Not much has been written from the perspective of those engaged, nor has there been much praise for the system's efforts. It is possible that the wide dispersion of resources has failed to develop a deep level of trust with their focus audience, and it is not clear how information from roundtables and other events is being used in DHS. It appears that the program has been accepted by communities, though that is only discernible through a lack of objection, which could also be the result of little awareness of the system.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)—FEMA has a more strategy and culture-oriented approach to engagement than CRCL, as Administrator William Craig Fugate has developed his "Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management"⁵¹ (*Whole Community*). In *Whole Community*, Fugate seeks to build resilience⁵² by bringing "residents, emergency management practitioners, organizational and community leaders, and government officials" together so that each may better understand the others' needs. Fugate believes that a greater understanding of the

⁴⁷ Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism*, 56.

⁴⁸ "DHS Community Engagement," US Department of Homeland Security.

⁴⁹ The excluded cities are New York, Philadelphia, Phoenix, San Antonio, San Diego, Dallas, and San Jose. Note that some of these cities were included in "special" meetings, but not consistent engagement, *USDHSCRCL, Fiscal Year 2010*, 14–15.

⁵⁰ Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism*, 56

⁵¹ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action*, December 2011, <http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=4941>.

⁵² Fugate uses the term as defined "Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8)," March 30, 2011, the ability to adapt to changing conditions and withstand and rapidly recover from disruption due to emergencies.

perspectives of multiple stakeholders will ultimately lead to a more efficient use of resources and support network in times of crisis.⁵³

Whole Community outlines a strategy that seems poised to build trust with communities. It encourages members of many parts of society (including government) to improve their communications and learn about each other's capabilities. This type of local, open discussion is in line with Bach and Kauffman's theories on developing trust.⁵⁴ Fugate also encourages the government to use the information to determine resource allocation, clear evidence that the strategy promotes bi-directional communication, rather than the more common centralized, top-down approach⁵⁵ that forces stakeholders to react to the government's actions.

The most difficult aspect of *Whole Community* may be implementation. While emergency managers in many municipalities already have relationships with partners from many aspects of society (as evidenced by the “Strategic Themes in Practice” section⁵⁶), it is unclear from the document if or how the federal government will also maintain these relationships, or if that will be left to the locals.

6. Department of Justice (DOJ)

Civil Rights Division—Much like DHS, DOJ has a portion of its outreach housed in a unit that more generally oversees civil rights prosecutions. Although the outreach is focused on a similar group (offenses against Muslims, Sikhs, and persons of Arab and South-Asian descent⁵⁷), the DOJ mission is slightly different, as it specifically aims to respond to “backlash” incidents against those communities.⁵⁸ This office appears to be focused on prosecutions, and research does not indicate that they take larger measures to engage residents.

⁵³ FEMA, *A Whole Community Approach*, 3.

⁵⁴ Bach and Kaufman, “A Social Infrastructure for Hometown Security.”

⁵⁵ Bach et al., “Policy Challenges in Supporting Community Resilience.”

⁵⁶ FEMA, *A Whole Community Approach*, 6.

⁵⁷ Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism*, 57.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

Community Relations Service—The Community Relations Service shares its target audience with the Civil Rights Division, but plays a much different role. The Community Relations Service operates in a fashion similar to CRCL, as it brings DOJ personnel to communities for outreach sessions and conflict resolution around backlash issues.⁵⁹ Because their outreach is based on backlash issues, the Community Relations Service takes a reactive approach. While they do attempt to establish trust with their audience, they do so after an event has already occurred, and may incur suspicion due to their post-event timing. It is unclear as to how the information from these meetings is used, however some of it may be taken for training purposes. Unlike CRCL, the Community Relations Service conducts awareness and cultural competency training for law enforcement officials, with a particular slant on preventing civil rights violations. While the DOJ has implemented this team, it is unclear whether it could be used in a proactive nature, or to provide trainings beyond a law enforcement scope.

Offices of the U.S. Attorneys (USAO)—The SIP places a great deal of responsibility for engagement on the USAO, noting that “United States Attorneys, in consultation with local and Federal partners, are best positioned to make local determinations about which communities they should engage.”⁶⁰ By being “best positioned,” the authors of SIP seem to be referring to the USAO’s organization by geographic boundaries—there are 93 district offices throughout the U.S., Puerto Rico, and Guam.⁶¹ They are referred to frequently throughout the SIP, and are cited as the lead agency in several engagement tactics. When referring strictly to countering violent extremism, the USAO has an outreach audience that sounds familiar: “Muslim, Sikh, and Arab American communities.”⁶² USAO has also similarly set up dialogues with these focus groups surrounding “specific situations and trends.”⁶³

⁵⁹ Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism*, 57.

⁶⁰ Office of the President, *Strategic Implementation Plan*, 8.

⁶¹ “List of Current US Attorneys’ Offices,” *Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia*, accessed March 12, 2012, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Attorney#List_of_current_U.S._Attorneys.27_offices.

⁶² Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism*, 58.

⁶³ Ibid.

When discussing the USAO focus on the broader picture of violence prevention, however, a much more robust framework for engagement comes to light. Since 1991, USAO has participated in Weed and Seed, Project Safe Neighborhoods, the Attorney General's Anti-Gang Strategy,⁶⁴ and other efforts that focused around outreach and intervention to local communities. Attorney General Eric Holder has placed a renewed focus on prevention, noting that citizens need both prosecution for crimes committed, as well as support for networks that help communities reduce destructive behaviors.⁶⁵ The Eastern District of Pennsylvania alone has worked on the following violence prevention initiatives, in addition to several others:

- Don't Fall Down in the Hood—The program was aimed at youth offenders who have been arrested for illegal guns, narcotics, or assaults, it aims to empower participants by teaching them how to use available resources to take control of their lives.
- Voice of Youth—The Eastern District USAO worked with a local arts organization and students in Philadelphia to begin a dialogue about how violence has affected their life, and then created a video together as an expression of their conversation. The video was then shown at a film festival, and used in addressing other youth groups. The program then expanded to bring in local athletes to participate in the conversations.
- Juvenile Justice/Criminal Justice Curriculum—A collaboration between the Philadelphia District Attorney and the Eastern District produced lessons for students in the Philadelphia School District to improve their understanding of the justice systems.
- Youth Court—The Eastern District worked with local schools to develop courts where students served as judges, jurors, bailiffs, jury foremen, and clerks. The exercise was designed to instruct students on the perspectives and responsibilities of those in the criminal justice process. The exercise was also intended to use peer pressure to promote positive decisions, and allow students to express their sentiments from different perspectives.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Robert K. Reed, "Expanding the Violence Prevention Role of the Department of Justice," *The US Attorneys' Bulletin*, 60, no. 3 (May 2012), 11.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Reed, "Expanding the Violence Prevention Role," 13–16.

These programs have demonstrated that the USAO is capable of effective community outreach: Their programs develop trust by developing relationships with citizens, particularly the youth; utilize information from sessions to shape future outreach efforts, as well as produce tangible products with the community; and over several years have shown to be a well-received approach, though limited by funding constraints. Even with funding limits, programs that empower individuals can have long-term results, as these strategies are designed to avoid reliance on a single guide or program.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—The FBI is mentioned as a participant in almost every federal CVE engagement document. However, very little information is available about outreach efforts being led by the FBI. Testimonies and literature exist that refer to an “extensive program”⁶⁷ to speak with, again “Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities in the United States,”⁶⁸ but provide little detail. Most documented outreach activities are coordinated at the local field offices.⁶⁹ The principal exception to this is the Specialized Community Outreach Team, which worked with several Somali communities in the U.S. regarding a threat surrounding the 2009 presidential inauguration.⁷⁰

While SIP primarily continues to see the FBI in a participant role in engagement the strategy also calls for the development of an FBI CVE Coordination Office, which will focus on developing CVE educational materials. The FBI’s engagement strategies appear to have the potential to build trust and develop two-way communications, but the perception of the FBI by their target audience may inhibit that from happening. The FBI may be more successful in serving as a partner or participant, rather than a leader in community engagement, at least until fears of domestic surveillance or targeted enforcement can be abated.

⁶⁷ Scott Atran, Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities: Countering Violent Extremism: Statement for the Record, Addendum-2, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., March 10, 2010, <http://armedservices.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/03%20March/Atran%2003-10-10.pdf>, 34.

⁶⁸ Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism*, 58.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 59.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

Building Communities of Trust (BCOT)—BCOT was an initiative in the DOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Its purpose was to determine ways to encourage residents to share information with law enforcement and fusion center representatives. The BCOT team held meetings in four locations across the country with a diverse group of stakeholders.⁷¹ The meetings were specifically focused on identifying ways in which the relationship between law enforcement and the community could be improved, with the ultimate goal of the community making recommendations for changes to government operations that would make them more willing to share public safety information.

The findings of BCOT were published in July 2010 as a series of recommendations for fusion center operators and local law enforcement officers involved in community policing.⁷² The recommendations were generally grouped into two categories: internal agency actions that would improve community relationships and overall transparency; and a guide to replicate the BCOT process. While many of the recommendations for the internal reforms are useful tools, the method for engagement may not be effective at ultimately cultivating trust. By singling out minorities and immigrants (who may be predisposed to not trusting government⁷³) for participation, these groups may feel targeted. This is particularly true in the context of a discussion focused on sharing public safety information, which may be perceived as “snitching.” The BCOT process seems to lack tangible examples for community members about how they benefit by providing information. This lack of buy-in may ultimately weaken the effectiveness of the program.

7. Coordination of Federal Engagement

To date, the only entity coordinating CVE outreach is “a National Task Force, led by DOJ and DHS, was established in November 2010 to help coordinate community

⁷¹ Robert Wasserman, *Guidance for Building Communities of Trust*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2010.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

engagement at the national level.”⁷⁴ Without one entity holding power, however, there is a strong chance that coordination will be difficult, as DOJ and DHS operated independently of each other. Leadership may be more effective if it is determined by the White House, by designating a single agency to serve as the principal hub for collecting, disseminating, and evaluating information on counter-radicalization. The main function of this leadership agency would be to collect, analyze, and share best practices with a wide range of governmental and non-governmental actors, including community leaders and non-profits. This agency could determine the best use of resources, and identify the most appropriate agencies to conduct outreach with different communities.

8. What We Haven’t Figured Out Yet

Regardless of the tactics used for engagement, Bach et al.’s notion of building social trust⁷⁵ is an essential characteristic of successful engagement programs. Bach et al. write that government officials and the public do not trust each other. They believe that officials are out of touch, partly due to the schism created between the two groups in the creation of the U.S. homeland security enterprise.⁷⁶ This schism has led to the formation of an engagement paradox: the government’s opaque handling of threats has led the public to become more reliant on the government for protection; as resources dwindle and threats increase in number, the government then asks the public to be prepared to defend itself; in the end, both sides see the other as unresponsive to their demands.⁷⁷

This paradox is further supported by literature that describes how a centralized federal structure is not effective at engaging communities. The vast majority of community engagement at the federal level involves centralized, top-down approaches.⁷⁸ This style of engagement has shown significant shortcomings, as it restricts the community’s input and responsibility. Bach et al. note that the U.S. government’s

⁷⁴ Office of the President, *Strategic Implementation Plan*, 8.

⁷⁵ Bach et al., “Policy Challenges in Supporting Community Resilience.”

⁷⁶ Bach and Kaufman, “A Social Infrastructure for Hometown Security.”

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Bach et al., “Policy Challenges in Supporting Community Resilience.”

structure for preparedness has traditionally been concentrated within the institutions of government and the disasters of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina demonstrated shortcomings in the ability of this approach to coordinate “across multiple agencies, sharing information, and having sufficient flexibility to meet asymmetric threats.”⁷⁹ Instead of being engaged in an open, proactive strategy, the community is forced to react to the government’s actions. Emergency plans, Ready.gov, and the Faith-Based and Community Initiative (FCBI) all fit this profile. Then-Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Chertoff confirmed this when he described the programs in 2007, as he applauded Ready.gov as an “advertising campaign.” Chertoff also described the FBCI’s ability to centralize groups whose very strength was their dispersion in communities.⁸⁰ The federal government has gone so far as to dilute effective community organizations by offering them funding, and then subjecting them to the bureaucracy required to distribute federal services.⁸¹ The top-down approach of centralized entities reinforces the patron-client relationship that has alienated many citizens from engaging in their government.⁸²

Top-down thinking, however, is not universally discarded as negative. After expounding on the benefits of community engagement for improving relations, information sharing, giving individuals an influence on decision making, and other benefits, Athol Yates writes that the top-down approach for engagement is actually necessary. He believes that national security does not allow it any other way.⁸³ Yates’ fatalistic description does not give any further argument; he simply accepts it as a truth and moves on with his description.

⁷⁹ Bach et al., “Policy Challenges in Supporting Community Resilience,” 5.

⁸⁰ United States Department of Health and Human Services, “Partnerships in Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery: The Role of Faith-Based and Community Organizations in building Resilient Communities,” *Compassion in Action Reports* (2008), accessed July 16, 2011, <https://www.hslc.org/?view&doc=105057&coll=limited>.

⁸¹ Bach et al., “Policy Challenges in Supporting Community Resilience.”

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Yates, “Community Involvement in National Security.”

9. Procedural Justice

The work of Dr. Fathali Moghaddam takes a similar approach to Bach et al. in his treatment of the importance of the relationship between government and the citizenry, but he does so with a perspective more focused on preventing terrorism. Moghaddam has developed a “staircase” metaphor to describe the progression of the mentality of individuals who eventually take actions that may qualify them as “terrorists.”⁸⁴ The “ground floor” of this staircase, or the beginning of the path of terrorism, revolves around an individual’s sense of fairness. This fairness can be multifaceted, from distribution of material wealth to the individual’s sense of “place” in society.⁸⁵ Among the different aspects of life that can be viewed with fairness, research supports the idea that procedural justice (defined by Moghaddam as “the process through which decisions are made”) is of primary importance.⁸⁶

Procedural justice can include many aspects of interactions between citizens and authority figures, including “how people feel they have been treated, whether they think they have been listened to, and whether their viewpoints have been given respect and consideration.”⁸⁷ Research has shown that when citizens view their government representatives as legitimate, those citizens are more likely to comply with the law, and reduces the cost associated with the judicial process.⁸⁸

Procedural justice research has determined that different contexts require different qualities of engagement. Tyler and Blader⁸⁹ note that one of the primary distinctions that must be made in procedural justice is between the different reasons citizens cooperate

⁸⁴ Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists’ Point of View*.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 45.

⁸⁶ Fathali M. Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Psychological Implications for Democracy in Global Context* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2011), 2nd Edition, 113.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler, and Aziz Z. Huq, “American Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative,” *The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology*, 101 (2011): 345.

⁸⁹ Tom R. Tyler and Steven L. Blader, “The Group Engagement Model: Procedural Justice, Social Identity, and Cooperative Behavior,” *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 7 (2003): 353.

with authorities. Their research shows that individuals are more likely to participate when the individuals experience “procedural fairness,” particularly when participation is not mandatory. These researchers find that the actual process of implementing decisions made by the group is done in an inclusive and thus “fair” manner. This indicates that both the rules themselves, as well as how they are implemented, can have an effect on the citizens’ perception of authority figures.⁹⁰

The research of Kristina Murphy further supports the argument, and shows that procedural justice has an impact on citizens’ impression of the legitimacy of the police, satisfaction with overall policing, and willingness to cooperate with police.⁹¹ Murphy also notes that the source of initiation of contact with police can change how interactions are viewed. Her research notes that procedural justice is most important to citizens when the police initiate the contact, while the performance of police duties is most important to citizens when the contact is initiated by citizens.⁹² This is an important differentiating lesson for citizen engagement programs that are driven, and thus initiated by, government officials.

Angelina Davis-Lipman, et al.⁹³ found that even more subtle characteristics can play a part in citizens’ determination of the importance of procedural justice in their interactions with authority figures. Their research focused on individuals’ willingness to receive help from authority figures. Subjects were most likely to accept help when they “received neutral, trustworthy, and respectful treatment.”⁹⁴ Subjects were less concerned, however, about the degree to which the distribution of outcomes was advantageous to their standing. This demonstrates that the fairness of the process was more important to

⁹⁰ Tom R. Tyler and Steven L. Blader, “The Group Engagement Model: Procedural Justice, Social Identity, and Cooperative Behavior,” *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 7 (2003): 355.

⁹¹ Kristina Murphy, “Public Satisfaction with Police: The Importance of Procedural Justice and Police Performance in Police-Citizen Encounters,” *The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 42 (2009): 159.

⁹² Ibid, 172.

⁹³ Angela Davis-Lipman, Tom R. Tyler, and Susan M. Andersen, “Building Community One Relationship at a Time: Consequences for the Seeking and Acceptance of Help,” *Social Justice Research*, 20 (2007): 181-206, accessed July 5, 2012, doi: 10.1007/s11211-007-0038-8.

⁹⁴ Ibid, 190.

participants than the actual outcome. This effect was even more pronounced in the study when the authority figure could be considered part of the subject's "group."⁹⁵ These results can be seen consistently across white, black, and Hispanic groups, with one caveat—minorities are more likely to have the impression that they have been or are currently not being treated fairly, and therefore are less willing to cooperate with authorities, particularly those who are not minorities.⁹⁶

Community policing provides a model that produces a high number of interactions between officials and citizens. Lessons taken from these interactions are valuable when designing and implementing engagement programs. Among the primary lessons learned with community policing is the need to customize strategies to specific situations, as described earlier regarding the research of Nolan, Conti, and McDevitt.⁹⁷

Other research studies place great importance on interactions with citizens and groups in the anomie communities. Gonzalez and Tyler's work⁹⁸ highlights the need to foster a "sense of social inclusion," particularly among citizens who they describe as feeling marginalized. According to Gonzalez and Tyler, this can be accomplished by giving citizens a voice—making sure that the citizens' perspective is being heard and understood during decision-making processes. Their research shows that this is seen as important and effective, regardless of whether or not the citizen input influenced decisions, or if the decision were already made. The important point was that the residents had a chance to express their perspective. This does not necessarily hold true, however, for those who perceive themselves to be more integrated with society.⁹⁹ The

⁹⁵ Angela Davis-Lipman, Tom R. Tyler, and Susan M. Andersen, "Building Community One Relationship at a Time: Consequences for the Seeking and Acceptance of Help," *Social Justice Research*, 20 (2007): 181–206, accessed July 5, 2012, doi: 10.1007/s11211-007-0038-8, 192.

⁹⁶ Schulhofer et al., "American Policing," 374.

⁹⁷ Nolan et al., "Situational Policing."

⁹⁸ Celia M. Gonzalez and Tom R. Tyler, "The Psychology of Enfranchisement: Engaging and Fostering Inclusion of Members through Voting and Decision-Making Procedures," *Journal of Social Issues*, 64 (2008): 447.

⁹⁹ Ibid, 457.

Gonzalez and Tyler study in particular makes a strong case for conducting engagement programs in anomic neighborhoods, as they can provide an opportunity for residents to present their perspectives.

Tyler, Schulhofer, and Huq have conducted several studies and written several articles regarding the use of procedural justice in counterterrorism policy and operations. In a 2009 study of Muslim Americans living in the five boroughs of New York City, the researchers found that procedural justice was central to the participants' opinions of both counterterrorism policy and implementation.¹⁰⁰ Their conclusion was reinforced by the surprising number of factors that had little to no effect on the subjects' willingness to cooperate. These factors include: the degree to which terrorism was seen as a serious problem; if the police made participants feel safer; perceptions of the police's effectiveness in combatting terrorism; police presence (including searches, surveillance, and harassment); Islamic identity; and opposition to American policies, especially internationally.¹⁰¹ This finding has been replicated outside of the counterterrorism realm as well. Murphy¹⁰² found that while several factors influence satisfaction levels with police services (including demographics and neighborhood context), these factors dramatically diminished in importance when opinions regarding procedural justice and police performance were introduced.

However, social discrimination based on religion or ethnicity was again (see earlier discussion of the perception of treatment of minorities) noted as negatively impacting cooperation.¹⁰³ As was the case with anomic communities, Muslims dealing with governments who are conducting large-scale counterterrorism operations are more interested in experiencing a fair process than receiving a beneficial outcome from the strategy.

¹⁰⁰ Tom R. Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer, and Aziz Z. Huq, "Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans," *Law & Society Review*, 44 (2010): 385.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 386.

¹⁰² Murphy, "Public Satisfaction with Police," 173.

¹⁰³ Tyler et al., "Legitimacy and Deterrence," 386.

This same research team of Tyler, Schulhofer, and Huq conducted a survey of Muslims living in the greater London area in 2010.¹⁰⁴ Many of the findings of that study supported the results of the 2009 U.S. study, but with a few new, nuanced exceptions. The primary finding of the 2009 survey regarding procedural justice as the most important influence on Muslim cooperation was reinforced. The finding continued to hold true with the elimination of other factors, particularly opinions regarding terrorism as an instrument of change. The study produced a particularly diverse group of opinions on terrorism, but still no correlation to the participants' willingness to cooperate.¹⁰⁵ This is a particularly strong endorsement for procedural justice as a key component to the Muslim perception of authority figures in a counterterrorism context. The study also noted that while perceptions of procedural justice could predict the degree to which UK police forces were seen as legitimate, legitimacy of the police did not independently impact cooperation.¹⁰⁶

In a 2011 article,¹⁰⁷ the research team extrapolated several of their findings and reinforced the pre-existing notion that terrorism is a policing concern, and that local police are in the best position to develop the hyper-local relationships that are necessary to build trust and defeat terrorist recruitment. This also assumes the perspective that terrorism, much like insurgency, can be defeated by gaining the loyalty of the population where the terrorists may be found.¹⁰⁸ The researchers also highlight that cooperation may be more difficult in counterterrorism situations, as the information given to the authorities could result in more severe punishment for offenders than regular policing, particularly to someone of their own ethnic group.¹⁰⁹ This delicate balance again

¹⁰⁴ Aziz Z. Huq, Tom R. Tyler, and Stephen J. Schulhofer, "Mechanisms for Eliciting Cooperation in Counterterrorism Policing: Evidence from the United Kingdom," *The University of Chicago Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series*, 340 (2011), accessed July 5, 2012, <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/publications/papers/publiclaw>.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 31.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 34.

¹⁰⁷ Schulhofer et al, "American Policing," 365.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 366.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

reinforces the importance of properly conducting strategic outreach, where members of the community are able to have input, coupled with counterterrorism tactics that are conducted in a fair and equitable manner. The study reveals that when this is done properly, the subjects' willingness to work with police rose 11 percent.¹¹⁰ More strikingly, the willingness of subjects to report "suspicious activity" increased by 61 percent.¹¹¹ These levels of increased support show a potentially tremendously valuable return on investment for equitable, participatory counterterrorism operations. These lessons about the Muslim community can be used to support engagement strategies and make them more effective for understanding and working with underserved communities.

Gonzalez and Tyler describe the United States as experiencing a "potentially developing crisis in the relationship between citizens and the government."¹¹² The researchers cite studies of gradually declining trust of the U.S. federal government due to the use of "unfair procedures and exhibiting untrustworthy behavior" since the Vietnam-era.¹¹³ Gonzalez and Tyler also make reference to the lack of transparent governmental procedures, which Bach et al. write is because authority figures are out of touch, partly due to the schism created between government officials and the public in the creation of the U.S. homeland security enterprise, the paradox described earlier.¹¹⁴ Gonzalez and Tyler note that this is particularly troublesome, as authorities rely on communities, particularly those that are susceptible to these communication issues, to help identify threats to the U.S.¹¹⁵

However, procedural justice research demonstrates that there are actions within the control of U.S. authority figures that can be used to improve the relationship between the federal government and anomie (or in counterterrorism cases, Muslim) communities.

¹¹⁰ Schulhofer et al., "American Policing," 372.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Gonzalez and Tyler, "The Psychology of Enfranchisement," 459.

¹¹³ Ibid, 460.

¹¹⁴ Bach and Kaufman, "A Social Infrastructure for Hometown Security."

¹¹⁵ Gonzalez and Tyler, "The Psychology of Enfranchisement," 461.

As the work of Tyler, Schulhofer, and Huq showed in counterterrorism operations, procedural justice far outweighed the impact of other mitigating factors in citizen interactions with authority figures. The three also believe that affording Muslim Americans a voice in formulating counterterrorism policy can have a great increase on the sense of procedural justice.¹¹⁶ The research of Murphy (described earlier) demonstrated that procedural justice and police performance (both of which are controlled by the government) are most impactful on satisfaction surveys.¹¹⁷

Colquitt and Rodell¹¹⁸ note that some simple attitudinal changes could help to improve the trust in interactions with authorities—they found that “Being concerned about the welfare of employees, sticking to one's word, and using sound values and principles to guide actions” all work towards increasing trust in professional relationships. The work of Barry and Tyler¹¹⁹ also note that members who perceive a group to have procedural justice issues may be more inclined to participate in that group’s events to correct the situation. This optimistic finding could be helpful in supporting the idea that those in anomic and Muslim communities may be willing to participate in the remediation of U.S. policies if invited.

10. What We Need to Know

Homeland security strategists and practitioners need to know how the federal government can adopt lessons from community engagement strategies to improve its own outreach, and ultimately its relationship with American residents, especially those in underserved communities. The U.S. federal system, in particular DHS, is military-style bureaucracy that operates from a central command and control system,¹²⁰ and is not designed to connect with communities in a decentralized way. To incorporate the Nolan

¹¹⁶ Tyler et al., “Legitimacy and Deterrence,” 388–389.

¹¹⁷ Murphy, “Public Satisfaction with Police,” 173.

¹¹⁸ Jason A. Colquitt and Jessica B. Rodell, “Justice, Trust, and Trustworthiness: A Longitudinal Analysis Integrating Three Theoretical Perspectives,” *Academy of Management Journal*, 54 (2011): 1202.

¹¹⁹ Heather Barry and Tom R. Tyler, “The Other Side of Injustice: When Unfair Procedures Increase Group-Serving Behavior,” *Psychological Science*, 20 (2009): 1031.

¹²⁰ Bach and Kaufman, “A Social Infrastructure for Hometown Security.”

methodology, the federal government may need to develop a very “local” initiative that can respond to the complexities of America’s communities. The Cities of Philadelphia and Chicago¹²¹ provide models of local engagement that serve similar purposes, but are not connected to the federal system. These, and other examples, are discussed in more detail in Chapter III.

As a corollary, the literature review also failed to define any strategy for communities that do not have a strong system of local organizations. Each of the documents reviewed, with the exception of the Nolan article¹²² and Home Office Online Report,¹²³ either described communities that successfully self-organized, or touted the benefits of engagement based on the assumption that communities had strong local groups. The closest information came from the procedural justice research, which generally encouraged a culture of inclusiveness. To develop a strategy that secures the goals of the homeland security enterprise, this will need to be addressed, as those “forgotten” communities may be the most attractive destinations for those who may become threats.

While the “forgotten” communities may seem to have the most dire plight, government officials must recognize that there is a certain degree of resiliency embedded in any community, regardless of how engaged it is or is not. Each community has its strengths, and respected citizens are raised in even the most troubled neighborhoods.¹²⁴ Engagement can help officials understand these communities more thoroughly, and use that knowledge to improve their performance.

The federal government recognizes the importance of this effort. In a guide for *Project Safe Neighborhoods*, engagement and resilience were shown to help improve

¹²¹ CAPS information from the Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium, “CAPS at Ten, Community Policing in Chicago, An Evaluation of Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy,” (2004). Accessed July 1, 2011, <https://portal.chicagopolice.org/i/cpd/clearpath/Caps10.pdf>. Information about PhillyRising provided by the City of Philadelphia Managing Director’s Office.

¹²² Nolan et al., “Situational Policing.”

¹²³ Camina, *Understanding and Engaging Deprived Communities*.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

crime reporting, developed new investigative and prosecution strategies, prevented misunderstandings about law enforcement programs, and strengthened gun crime prevention efforts.¹²⁵

The challenge is to figure out how to take what is known about local engagement and tie it into a federal framework.

D. METHOD

1. Methodology

The methods include a literature review, case study, and policy analysis. The literature review was used to gain an understanding of the theory behind the problem space and define desirable qualities for a framework to effectively address these issues, and identify gaps that require the creation of a new framework. It was also used to identify criteria to evaluate existing engagement programs. The case studies reviewed existing engagement programs (domestic and international) to evaluate their effectiveness, strengths, and weaknesses. The policy analysis was used to develop a framework for engagement that may be applied on a large scale, and fulfill the criteria established from the literature review and analytical framework.

2. Data Sample

The existing engagement programs selected for the case study are operated by the governments of Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Great Britain. Aspects of each of these programs were mentioned in the literature review for this thesis, as each has strengths that may be considered smart practices: Chicago has seen success building on its city-wide community policing model to empower citizens; Philadelphia has built trust with residents in more focused areas of high crime and low quality of life; Los Angeles has conducted specific Muslim outreach to improve its' homeland security standing; and the United Kingdom provides a model of a national engagement strategy based on homeland security. These programs have also experienced setbacks that can be analyzed

¹²⁵ Institute for Law and Justice, "Engaging the Community in Project Safe Neighborhoods."

to identify weaknesses to consider when developing recommendations for a federal framework for engagement. The definition of community caused several perception issues in Los Angeles, and will serve as the most significant setback evaluated among the cases.

Please note that the author is the Director of the PhillyRising Collaborative. This allowed the author to leverage first-hand knowledge and experience of engagement operations in an urban setting. This may have also introduced some bias in favor of local engagement programs. To combat this bias, the author developed a consistent framework (as seen in Chapter II) to apply to each case studied in this thesis. The author also sought competing viewpoints when conducting the literature review.

Chapter II, Analytical Framework, outlines in the background of the specific aspects of each case that were evaluated: how each agency defined the community to be engaged, what tactics were used for engagement, what cost/resources were needed for implementation, and how each strategy was evaluated by their audience for success.

To determine a suitable structure for engagement at the federal level, existing federal outreach programs were evaluated in the literature review. The analysis from the literature review was later compared with the notion of the Regional Outreach and Operations Coordination Center (ROOCC), as proposed by Brad Deardorff in his thesis *Countering Violent Extremism: the Challenge and the Opportunity*.¹²⁶ Deardorff envisions ROOCC as centers that house a wide variety of specialists and coordinate outreach missions within the U.S., in a manner that aims to improve communications with the Muslim community in America. The ROOCC concept was evaluated for its feasibility as a portion of the federal engagement structure outlined in this thesis, and as a model for countering anti-American messages propagated by terrorists.

¹²⁶ Robert B. Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity” (MA diss, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009).

3. Data Collection

Data was collected for this thesis primarily through published materials. It involved examination of primary sources produced by the agencies that were used as case studies, as well as reviews conducted of the programs from various independent sources and newspaper articles when available. It also involved a literary review that examined theoretical issues underlying the research question and problem space. Research focused on existing academic studies that are relevant to the underlying assumptions of this thesis, specifically related to the research question and the subquestions.

4. Data Analysis

Analysis for this thesis was taken from an appreciative inquiry perspective – the review of the case studies identified smart practices, policies and tactics that provided for successful engagement, with a particular emphasis on building trust. The findings were used to develop recommendations for the development of a federal system for engaging communities throughout the U.S. Appreciative inquiry has been chosen as a lens for analysis because the nature of the problem space required a creative solution. As mentioned in the literature review, there is no current national U.S. engagement framework. By taking an appreciative approach, this thesis analyzed existing engagement strategies, and built on their strengths to create a system that incorporates lessons learned from domestic and international governments.

The ultimate goal of this thesis was to take successful existing engagement methods and develop the beginning of a framework that can be applied at multiple levels of government across the U.S. The framework, identified as “the Rising System,” incorporates the federal, state, and county/local/tribal (as appropriate) entities that serve communities selected for focused engagement. The Rising System is designed to provide a recommendation for how the U.S. public safety and homeland security communities can effectively use citizen engagement as a violence prevention method.

E. THESIS ORGANIZATION

The first chapter of this thesis contains the structure of how the research was conducted, as well as a literature that reviewed the academic support for the benefits of engagement and perspectives on the qualities of how engagement may be conducted. Chapter II provides an analytical framework for evaluating engagement programs. It specifically develops three criteria that are the basis for evaluation: The focus each program places on violence prevention, the method by which each program defines “community,” and the degree to which each program demonstrates its ability to effectively build trust with the community. Chapter III conducts a comparative analysis of engagement programs in Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Great Britain. Each case is evaluated for positive qualities that may be applied to a U.S. federal engagement system, as well as pitfalls to avoid. Chapter IV outlines the Rising System, the engagement strategy proposed based on the findings of the research conducted for this thesis. Finally, Chapter V specifically addresses the applicability of the research and Rising System to the research questions, and describes some other aspects that may be evaluated in future research.

II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter presents the framework that will be used to evaluate the case studies in Chapter III. The items selected for analysis were themes that emerged from the literature review that warranted further examination: Community engagement as a violence prevention tool, how communities may be defined, and how certain tactics can be used to develop trust between citizens and government. The analysis for each theme produced criteria by which the case studies in Chapter III will be evaluated. The criteria were then used to specify further subsets of the research question for exploration in the case studies, as well as aspects to address in the recommendations. A chart that maps the criteria and questions can be found at the end of this chapter.

A. THE NEED FOR TRUE PREVENTION

On September 11, 2011, the U.S. marked the tenth anniversary of the War on Terror. In the past decade, U.S. counterterrorism, military, and police forces have focused on executing tactics to disrupt activities that pose a threat to public safety. Intelligence analysts and investigators have spent the majority of their time seeking connections to learn about terror plots and stop them before implementation. The lack of another successful major terrorist attack in the U.S. seems to indicate that these strategies have been effective, but they have a common shortcoming—they are all reactive.¹²⁷ The U.S. lacks a true prevention strategy¹²⁸—one that seeks to stop individuals from choosing an extremist path before they are fully committed. The need for such efforts is explicitly recognized in the *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* (2011).¹²⁹ Strategies such as *Empowering Local Partners* and the *Strategic Implementation Plan*, as discussed in

¹²⁷ Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism,” 9.

¹²⁸ Atran, Senate Armed Services Subcommittee, 34.

¹²⁹ Office of the President of the United States, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* (June 2011), 9–10.

Chapter I, have made progress in this area, but are not yet fully-developed, comprehensive strategies for federal prevention.

While development of a comprehensive prevention strategy would have a positive impact on the homeland security resources allocated to disruption, its impact may be even more significant on another aspect of homeland security that the U.S. has grappled with—what to do with convicted terrorists. As the U.S. has become more successful at interrupting violent plots, the government finds itself holding prisoners who have demonstrated their devout hatred of the United States. Although official estimates of the number of convicted or suspected terrorists in U.S. custody are difficult to obtain, a 2009 fact sheet from the Department of Defense noted that 530 detainees had been transferred out of Guantanamo Bay, and that 14 percent of those released were either confirmed or suspected of re-engaging in terrorist activities.¹³⁰ This is a result of what Dr. Andrew Silke describes as a “protracted terrorist conflict.” According to Silke, involvement in this type of conflict will lead the U.S. to pursue new counterterrorism options:

In protracted terrorist conflicts, many states eventually come to recognize the value of giving active terrorists a third option. The first option is continued involvement in the terrorist group and in terrorist activity. Option two is death or incarceration at the hands of the state. The third option is effectively a “get out” clause that allows individuals to put their involvement in a conflict behind them without having to face the severe penalties normally meted out by the state.¹³¹

To determine the best way to handle the “third option,” the U.S. must first focus its attention on what the goals of this option would be. If detained extremists are reintegrated into American society, how will officials determine when it is safe to do so? What level of disassociation from their past will suffice?

Two basic categories exist to classify the goals of the third option: disengagement and deradicalization. A disengaged terrorist is one who has abandoned the

¹³⁰ United States Department of Defense, “Fact Sheet: Former Guantanamo Detainee Terrorist Trends,” (2008), accessed June 11, 2011,
<http://www.defense.gov/news/d20080613Returntothefightfactsheet.pdf>.

¹³¹ Andrew Silke, “Disengagement or Deradicalization: A Look at Prison Programs for Jailed Terrorists,” *CTC Sentinel* 4 (2011), 18.

use of violence, and may break association with a violent group.¹³² A deradicalized terrorist is one who has renounced a violent ideology, assumed a moderate ideology, and may be willing to participate peacefully in society.¹³³ The distinction between the two is critical, as disengagement and deradicalization involve different processes, and studies have shown each to have different levels of success.¹³⁴ With the relatively short life span of programs focused on deradicalization (few have existed for more than ten years), more long-term research is needed to determine the ultimate success of such programs.¹³⁵ The lack of proven programs to deal with these prisoners enhances the sense of urgency needed for preventing radicalization.

Criteria for Evaluation: Engaging individuals before they embark on an extremist path may be the most effective way to deal with these issues. The case studies that follow will be evaluated to the degree to which they provide a proactive strategy to prevent conditions that may contribute toward radicalization and/or alienation. Strategies with a reactive component will also be credited for ameliorating negative situations, but preference will be given to efforts that prevent these conditions. These aspects will be captured through questions categorized under “Engagement Tactics” in Figure 2.1, Methodology Matrix.

B. DEFINING THE COMMUNITY

To engage individuals who may be at risk for radicalization, the government must first have a method for defining which communities are the most susceptible to extremist

¹³² Amanda K. Johnston, “Assessing the Effectiveness of Deradicalization Programs for Islamist Extremists” (MA diss, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009): 9.

¹³³ *ICT’s Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group Insights*, “The De-Radicalization Process of Terrorist Organizations: The Libyan Case (The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group – LIFG/Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah Al-Muqatilah fi-Libya),” (2010): 2, accessed June 11, 2011, http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_De_Radicalization_LIFG.pdf.

¹³⁴ John Horgan, “Deradicalization or Disengagement? A Process in Need of Clarity and a Counterterrorism Initiative in Need of Evaluation,” *Perspectives on Terrorism*. 2, No. 4 (2008), accessed June 11, 2011, <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/32/html>.

¹³⁵ Marisa L. Porges, “The Saudi Deradicalization Experiment,” *Council on Foreign Relations Expert Brief* (2009), accessed June 11, 2011, <http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/saudi-deradicalization-experiment/p21292>.

influences. Communities may be defined by a number of characteristics: neighborhood, city, county, region, ethnicity, culture, race, groups with common interests, and even geographic areas as small as a block or housing development may have a distinct identity.¹³⁶ A brief literature review demonstrated that several disciplines, particularly from the perspective of government agencies, have attempted to codify the characteristics that define communities. Two of the most prolific attempts have come from the public health and policing fields.

MacQueen et al. conducted research from a public health perspective to define a community. Their survey found four characteristics that were used by more than half of their respondents to describe a community: Locus (sense of place), sharing (common interest / perspective), action (participating in activities together), and social ties (relationships).¹³⁷ Their research further suggested that “locus” is so critical to community identity that as the sense of place dwindled, so did the overall sense of community.

While the MacQueen study found that four characteristics were most important to identifying a community, their survey also showed thirteen other relevant characteristics. The researchers concluded that there are so many characteristics of communities, that no standard approach can be used to reach any one group.¹³⁸ MacQueen et al. ultimately defined community as:

a group of people with diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, share common perspectives, and engage in joint action in geographical locations or settings.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ Daniel W. Flynn, *Defining the “Community” in Community Policing*: Police Executive Research Forum, 1998.

¹³⁷ Kathleen M. MacQueen, Eleanor McLellan, David S. Metzger, Susan Kegeles, Ronald P. Strauss, Roseanne Scotti, Lynn Blanchard, and Robert T. Trotter II, “What is Community? An Evidence-Based Definition for Participatory Public Health,” *American Journal of Public Health*, 91 no. 12 (December 2011), 1929.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

Research from the policing perspective produced similar results. In a publication for the Police Executive Research Forum, Daniel Flynn described three general characteristics that are found to be the basis of a community: geography, a shared sense of character or identity, and common concerns.¹⁴⁰ These three considerations contain an enormous number of potential combinations to define neighborhoods, and should not be oversimplified. However, they are remarkably similar to the characteristics identified by the MacQueen study, and the different perspectives appear to validate each other.

Defining the community from the perspective of policing, particularly community policing, requires an emphasis on geography, as American police departments (at least patrol divisions) are generally organized with physical boundaries. While police departments may attempt to use “natural” boundaries for their divisions, these may not always be congruous with communities defined by residents. In these situations, the police (and their partners) must work to ignore the artificial limits of their patrol areas, and instead focus on the “natural” (ethnic, socioeconomic, religious, etc.) boundaries of neighborhoods.¹⁴¹ Proper identification of communities is critical to the success of engagement activities (including community policing).¹⁴²

While there are clearly many methods for defining communities, there are also various levels of organization within communities. The community policing literature reviewed for this thesis almost exclusively assumed that a relatively coherent community exists to be organized, engaged, or led. However, Alpert and Moore cite several examples (such as suburbs that mature quickly and inner city neighborhoods in decline) that may not have an existing system of organization.¹⁴³ While there are success stories of

¹⁴⁰ Flynn, *Defining the “Community.”*

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Gary W. Cordner, “Community Policing: Elements and Effects.” In *Community Policing Contemporary Readings*, edited by G. Alpert and A. Piquero. 3rd ed. Prospect Heights, IL.: Waveland, 1998, as cited in Flynn, *Defining the “Community.”*

¹⁴³ Geoffrey P. Alpert and Mark H. Moore, “Measuring Police Performance in the New Paradigm of Policing.” In *Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System: Discussion Papers from the BJS-Princeton Project*, United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice programs, NCJ-143505, 1993.

government officials assisting in developing a sense of communal identity,¹⁴⁴ such development requires a fundamental system for building capacity. These are the communities that Nolan, Conti, and McDevitt described as “anomic,” and may be the most attractive areas for the development of criminal enterprises.¹⁴⁵

Criteria for Evaluation: The method for defining communities is thus crucial to the success of an engagement strategy. The case studies that follow will be evaluated on their method of defining communities. Definitions may include a geographic component, recognize common interests or social ties, or use other data. None of these criteria should be mutually exclusive. Cases will also be evaluated for how they treat anomic neighborhoods, and if they undertake any capacity-development efforts. Cases will also be evaluated to determine whether they customize approaches to different communities or use a more universal approach. These aspects will be captured through questions categorized under “Definition of Community” in Figure 2.1, Methodology Matrix.

C. TRUST AND ENGAGEMENT

While choosing communities properly is a critical first step in an outreach process, the long-term goal of engagement programs is to build trust between the community and government officials. The Literature Review in Chapter I contains several references to the criticality of trust, none as prominent as the discussion of Bach et al.’s notion of social trust. They concluded that communities need to be an active participant in their government to develop trust with its representatives.¹⁴⁶

The Center for Disease Control (CDC) has conducted numerous outreach activities focused on disease prevention, and in that process have identified several variables that have aided their progress. The most prominent of these was their ability to create a “safe space” for community discussion. CDC researchers credit their willingness to listen to the concerns of residents as the driver for the development of trust with the

¹⁴⁴ See the example of Judge Thomas Peterson in Dade County, FL, in Alpert and Moore, “Measuring Police Performance.”

¹⁴⁵ Bach and Kaufman, “A Social Infrastructure for Hometown Security.”

¹⁴⁶ Bach et al., “Policy Challenges in Supporting Community Resilience.”

residents. They observed that as trust developed, they were able to more effectively provide services in a way that was acceptable to the local community, as residents helped to ensure that solutions were culturally appropriate.¹⁴⁷

Once again, public health literature supports policing research, as community policing techniques have been shown to be able to create this kind of “safe space.” Though they provide an obviously different research perspective, community policing has been acknowledged as a successful tool at building qualities that build intelligence collection capabilities.¹⁴⁸ That is to say, community policing has helped develop environments where community members voluntarily share information (sometimes sensitive) about their communities – people intelligence expert Mark Lowenthal calls “walk-ins.”¹⁴⁹

Walk-ins provide an important aspect to preventing extremism, as they provide local experts with valuable intelligence information, without resorting to domestic surveillance methods on the part of government officials. The rights granted in the U.S. Constitution (and other legal documents) place limits on the government’s ability to spy on Americans without first engaging in due process. As the *9/11 Commission Report* highlighted, however, there is a need for a greater understanding of domestic threats to national security.¹⁵⁰ Promoting walk-ins, who voluntarily share information, may provide a useful source of information. Promotion may also help mitigate Phillip Bobbit’s “antinomies,” a series of six opposing legal regulations in the American system that, according to Bobbit, must be balanced to effectively protect the American

¹⁴⁷ Sharrice White-Cooper, E. Yvonne Lewis, Ella Greene-Moton, Jo Anne Grunbaum, and Barbara Gray, “Community Engagement in Preventive Research: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Prevention Research Centers’ National Community Committee,” *Progress in Community Health Partnerships: Research, Education, and Action*, 3, 1 (Spring, 2009): 73.

¹⁴⁸ Wasserman, *Guidance for Building Communities of Trust*.

¹⁴⁹ Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 4th ed., Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009: 97–103.

¹⁵⁰ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2004).

homeland. Specifically, walk-ins can aid in resolving the conflicts caused by the regulations on domestic versus international intelligence gathering.¹⁵¹ To encourage walk-ins, trust is again a key factor.

While many tactics such as the Department of Justice's Building Communities of Trust (discussed in Chapter I) have focused on policing efforts, Alpert and Moore noted that the police cannot be solely held responsible for, nor on their own remedy anomic neighborhoods. Anomic neighborhoods require an interdisciplinary system, which relies on other agencies and residents contributing to a community's long-term health.¹⁵² This type of system is congruent with the notion that communities need to take responsibility for their own quality of life. Professor John DiIulio takes this further and describes citizens as "co-producers of justice." He notes that citizens have responsibility to work with local officials to actively improve their quality of life.¹⁵³ Many of his examples, including witnesses testifying against local offenders, may be the product of enhanced trust and engagement. DiIulio also notes that "promoting secure communities" means more than purely lowering crime rates, it also means attending to the perception of safety and quality of life issues that can prevent communities from prospering.¹⁵⁴ However, these are not necessarily mutually exclusive - a study conducted by University of Pennsylvania researchers showed that impacting quality of life issues can assist in crime reduction. The study specifically showed that "greening" vacant lots reduced gun assaults, vandalism, and criminal mischief, and had a positive effect on the health of those living near the lots.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵¹ Philip Bobbit, *Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), 296–297.

¹⁵² Alpert and Moore, "Measuring Police Performance."

¹⁵³ John J. DiIulio, "Rethinking the Criminal Justice System: Toward a New Paradigm." In *Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System: Discussion Papers from the BJS-Princeton Project*, United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice programs, NCJ-143505, 1993.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Charles C. Branas, Rose A. Cheney, John M. MacDonald, Vicky W. Tam, Tara D. Jackson, and Thomas R. Ten Have, "A Difference-in-Differences Analysis of Health, Safety, and Greening Vacant Urban Space," *American Journal of Epidemiology*, 174, no. 11 (November 11, 2011), 1296.

This holistic concept is reinforced by statistics from the Bureau of Justice that demonstrate that victimization is not necessarily the cause of fear for many citizens.¹⁵⁶ Alpert and Moore see the improvement of perception of safety as a relatively simple task, one that can be primarily accomplished by police officers undertaking simple tasks, such as leaving their vehicles and walking foot beats.¹⁵⁷ This is not to say, however, that effective traditional policing is not necessary in community policing. Quite the opposite, traditional policing is necessary to maintain credibility of the outreach efforts, and to protect the safety of those who participate. Much like the counterinsurgency efforts studied by Flood et al. residents are much more likely to get involved in engagement activities if they feel safe doing so.¹⁵⁸

It should be noted that engagement activities are not universally seen as an effective way for government entities to achieve their goals. A report by Weisner about health worker outreach showed that in one particular community, outreach did not improve residents' attendance at local health centers. Weisner also notes that this is not necessarily generalizable to other aspects of health outreach, as studies in India have produced contradictory results.¹⁵⁹ This is one of many examples that reinforce the broad range of factors that contribute to the success or failure of engagement activities.

Criteria for Evaluation: To establish relationships that ultimately lead to communities sharing more public safety information with appropriate authorities, a strategy should be developed that incorporates a wider vision of public safety. While the Building Communities of Trust model laid out a feasible process for engagement, it made the assumption that individuals and organizations would be willing to share safety information after a few reforms, once they understood the “big picture” of how sharing would benefit them. Instead, the engagement should begin by discussing quality of life

¹⁵⁶ Alpert and Moore, “Measuring Police Performance.”

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Patrick M. Flood, William J. Marm, and Christopher T. Young, “Success in COIN: Aligning Organizational Structure with Strategy” (MS diss, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010).

¹⁵⁹ Stan Weisner, “The Impact of Community Intervention,” *Social Science Review*, 51, no. 4 (December, 1977): 659.

issues in the community—issues that underserved communities (including minorities and immigrants) may feel comfortable sharing, since it is less likely to be perceived as spying or “snitching.” Focusing on geographic communities rather than interest groups may also aid in nullifying the perception that any group is being “singled out.” Each of the case studies will be evaluated for their techniques used to build long-term trust with local communities. The creation of a “safe space” for discussion and promotion of walk-ins will be given the most credit. These aspects will be captured through questions categorized under “Engagement Tactics” in Figure 2.1, Methodology Matrix.

Research Question				
How can homeland security practitioners leverage what is known about local citizen engagement to improve federal outreach in a way that makes communities safer?				
	Questions for Cases			
Research Subquestions				
Definition of Community	With limited resources, engagement strategies must be focused on areas where they will have the most significant impact. How can the government identify areas that are high-risk for crime or terrorism?	What criteria did the strategy use to determine which communities would be engaged?	Did the criteria/definition impact the community's perception of the motivations behind the strategy?	Did the strategy show any indicators that the strategy chose a definition of community that was congruent with the perception of those engaged?
	How can engagement be used to build resilience and trust?	What tactics did the strategy use to define/implement engagement? Was the creation of a "safe space" a component of the process?	Did the strategy have a demonstrable impact on the level of trust between the community and government?	Which tactics of the strategy were particularly successful at establishing trust?
	What aspects of engagement might help counter the terrorist narrative preventing individuals from becoming involved in terrorist organizations?	Did the strategy focus on individuals who already chose a violent lifestyle, or was it based on prevention tactics?	Which tactics of the strategy were particularly successful at countering the attraction of violent lifestyles?	Which tactics did not seem to have an impact, or had a negative impact, on the community?
Engagement Tactics	How can engagement change the behavior of potentially dangerous individuals?	Did the strategy focus on improving the quality of life of the focus community?	How did the program impact individual lives?	
	What specialties or resources are needed to conduct an effective engagement process?	What were the hard costs for the strategy's implementation?	What qualities were common to the resources used in the strategy?	Did any resources come from non-governmental organizations or from within the communities?
Cost/Resource Allocation				Were multiple levels of government involved in the engagement process?

Figure 2.1. Methodology Matrix

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III. MODELS TO BRIDGE THE THREATS

In this chapter, four case studies were evaluated based on the questions listed in the matrix at the end of Chapter II. The evaluation begins with a brief background description of each case, and then an evaluation across the cases of three elements of the engagement strategies based on the findings of the research described in the previous chapters:

- a) How “community” is defined;
- b) Which tactics were used to engage the community; and
- c) What costs/resources were needed to implement each strategy?

These factors will be compared across Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy, the City of Philadelphia’s PhillyRising Collaborative, and the United Kingdom’s Prevent strategy. A fourth case, based on the work of the Los Angeles Police Department’s Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau, will be used solely in the section on defining the term “community.” This is due partially to a lack of published information regarding the Los Angeles unit’s engagement tactics, as well as their focus on solely using police services.

A. BACKGROUND

1. Chicago—Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy

Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) began as a pilot in 1993. CAPS began in five of Chicago’s police districts, and later expanded to the city’s twenty remaining districts. When expansion was achieved in all police districts, the strategy was considered to be operational in all of Chicago’s neighborhoods.¹⁶⁰

The CAPS strategy is based in four “Key Elements:”

¹⁶⁰ Chicago Police Department, “What is CAPS (Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy)?” Accessed April 27, 2012, <https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/Get%20Involved/How%20CAPS%20works/What%20is%20CAPS.>

1. Expand Police Presence on the Beat
2. Community Involvement
3. Support from Other Agencies
4. Proactive Problem Solving¹⁶¹

The theory behind CAPS stems from the “broken windows” concept articulated by James Wilson and George Kelling. Wilson and Kelling theorize that “disorder undermines the capacity of a neighborhood to defend itself.”¹⁶² To reduce the amount of physical disorder (e.g., vandalism, abandoned buildings and lots, malfunctioning street lights,¹⁶³), the Chicago Police worked with city agencies to address quality of life issues including code enforcement, drug house and gang enforcement, landlord-tenant conflicts (including municipal administrative adjudication), liquor regulation, school safety, graffiti, abandoned buildings, trash, abandoned cars, and the general coordination of service delivery.¹⁶⁴ In addition to problems with the physical aspect of quality of life, CAPS has addressed behaviorally-based issues termed “social disorder,” which include loitering, public drinking, and disruption in schools.¹⁶⁵

According to a 2004 report, CAPS is well known to Chicago residents, particularly among its Caucasian and African-American populations, where more than eighty percent of their populations reported familiarity with the program. In 2002, over 67,000 people attended CAPS beat meetings, the neighborhood-based problem solving sessions focused around the Chicago Police Department’s geographic beats within each district. Each of the twenty-five districts created district advisory committees to examine and solve problems that affected all beats within a district. Despite the strong gross

¹⁶¹ City of Chicago, *CAPS at Five: A Report on the Progress of Community Policing in Chicago*, 1999, 5–7.

¹⁶² Wesley G. Skogan and Lynn Steiner, *CAPS at Ten: Community Policing in Chicago, an Evaluation of Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy*: The Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium, 2004, 75.

¹⁶³ City of Chicago, *CAPS at Five*, 7.

¹⁶⁴ Skogan and Steiner, *CAPS at Ten*, 77–99.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, 99–102.

attendance level at beat meetings, participants was not consistently representative of the entire city demographic, as a disproportionate attendance came from “more educated residents, homeowners, and older, long-term residents.”¹⁶⁶

2. Philadelphia—The PhillyRising Collaborative

The PhillyRising Collaborative (PhillyRising) is a strategy coordinated through the Managing Director’s Office¹⁶⁷ of the City of Philadelphia. PhillyRising began as a pilot program in February 2010 with the mission of supplementing the Philadelphia Police Department’s Police Service Areas (community policing initiative¹⁶⁸). The strategy focuses on coordinating civilian municipal services in areas that qualified as having chronic issues of crime and disorder.

While the pilot program encompassed only one neighborhood, by April 2012 PhillyRising had expanded to ten neighborhoods across Philadelphia,¹⁶⁹ and had demonstrated a significant reduction in Part I Crime (as defined by the Uniform Crime Reporting system)¹⁷⁰ in the pilot neighborhood. The purpose, according to the PhillyRising website, is as follows:

PhillyRising targets neighborhoods throughout Philadelphia that are plagued by chronic crime and quality of life concerns, and establishes partnerships with community members to address these issues. The

¹⁶⁶ Skogan and Steiner, *CAPS at Ten*, iii.

¹⁶⁷ “The Managing Director is the Cabinet-level executive who directly supervises several of the City’s operating departments. With the aid of five Deputy Mayors and their support staff, the Managing Director’s Office (MDO) provides oversight, support and assistance to these departments.” Taken from City of Philadelphia, “Managing Director’s Office,” accessed April 27, 2012, <http://www.phila.gov/mdo/>.

¹⁶⁸ The PSA strategy assigns Philadelphia Police Officers to smaller patrol areas, and encourages problem-solving activities with community members, similar several aspects of CAPS. Taken from Philadelphia Police Department, “Introducing Police Service Areas,” accessed April 27, 2012, <http://phillypolice.com/news/police-service-areas-in-your-districts/>.

¹⁶⁹ The full list of neighborhoods selected for PhillyRising is available at <http://www.phila.gov/phillyrising/>.

¹⁷⁰ Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI – UCR General FAQs,” accessed April 27, 2012, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/frequently-asked-questions/ucr_faqs.

PhillyRising Team coordinates the actions of City agencies to help neighbors realize their vision for their community through sustainable, responsive, and cost-effective solutions.¹⁷¹

To achieve these goals, PhillyRising focuses on the following principles when engaging communities and developing strategies to improve quality of life:

- Responsive—PhillyRising staff solicit ideas from residents to determine most prominent local issues, as well as suggestions to ameliorate these issues. The staff work as partners, rather than as a service provider and clients, to develop strategies for improving quality of life and reducing crime. This process creates a unique plan for each neighborhood.
- Capacity Building—The PhillyRising model is rooted in the notion that communities contain residents who are capable of improving the areas where they live. Neighborhoods selected for PhillyRising occasionally fit Nolan, Conti, and McDevitt's definition of anomie,¹⁷² as they contain high levels of crime and low levels of effective community organization. Despite the existing level of community efficacy, PhillyRising staff work to provide education and access to resources that will ultimately be coordinated by residents. The model aims to have PhillyRising staff teach residents rather than create a dependency.
- Sustainable—Solutions created through the PhillyRising process are based on residents' ideas and ultimately run by residents. City service providers do not sweep in with overwhelming resources for brief periods of time. While the City facilitates the start of solutions, empowered residents are supported to maintain programs. The intention of this style of operation is to produce long-term results that can be supported from within the community.

3. Los Angeles Police Department

The Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD) Counterterrorism operations were built as a series of post-9/11 reforms.¹⁷³ As of June 2011, the system was composed of the following components: a Joint Regional Intelligence Center; a Suspicious Activity Reporting process; Terrorism Liaison Officers; Operation Archangel, a partnership with

¹⁷¹ City of Philadelphia, "Office of the Managing Director - PhillyRising," accessed April 27, 2012, <http://www.phila.gov/phillyrising/>.

¹⁷² See Chapter I for more details.

¹⁷³ Fishman and Lebovich, "Countering Domestic Radicalization."

private industry to protect critical infrastructure; the National Counter Terrorism Academy; the Hydra program, which works with disaster officials across the region; and the Counterterrorism/Criminal Intelligence Bureau).¹⁷⁴ The community outreach component is located within two programs: the Muslim Forum, a space for dialogue between leadership in the LAPD and Muslim communities;¹⁷⁵ and the Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau, the section within LAPD that is focused on community engagement from the counterterrorism perspective.¹⁷⁶ Both of these outreach programs are rooted in communications with Muslims living in Los Angeles. The overall counterterrorism operations for LAPD are highly regarded, and in November 2011 the Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau was named “Most Notable Law Enforcement Counter Terrorism or Crime Prevention Program” by Government Security News.¹⁷⁷

4. The United Kingdom—Prevent

The case of the United Kingdom will be evaluated in a slightly different light, as it is the product of a national government, rather than a local government. Despite the cultural differences, the United Kingdom’s experience with counterterrorism can provide a useful comparison with practices used in the U.S., particularly from the perspective of the impact of national policy.

In July 2011, the British government released a revision its comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, *CONTEST*. In the current edition, *CONTEST* is divided into

¹⁷⁴ Fishman and Lebovich, “Countering Domestic Radicalization,” 16.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Los Angeles Police Department, “Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau Liaison Section,” Microsoft PowerPoint Presentation.

¹⁷⁷ Government Security News, “LAPD Wins GSN’s 2011 Award for ‘Most Notable Law Enforcement Counter Terrorism or Crime Prevention Program,’ accessed April 27, 2012, http://www.gsnmagazine.com/node/25094?c=law_enforcement_first_responders.

four sections: *Pursue*, *Prevent*, *Protect*, and *Prepare*. The segment that most closely parallels the U.S. ELP/SIP strategies is *Prevent*, with the goal “to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.”¹⁷⁸

The responsibility for the whole of *CONTEST* falls to the Home Office, leaving the Home Secretary ultimately in charge of the plan. There is also clear oversight, with the most recent version of *Prevent* audited by Lord Carlile of Berriew QC.¹⁷⁹ This centralized system of responsibility, as well as a power check on the lead agency,¹⁸⁰ creates a clear center of power that street-level practitioners can look to for guidance.

In *Prevent*’s forward, Home Secretary MP Theresa May clearly states that it is a plan for counter-terrorism operations, not for “integration.”¹⁸¹ The British use of integration here refers to government policy that creates “the conditions for everyone to live and work successfully alongside each other.”¹⁸² This is a critical distinction for the British, one that was clarified in the 2011 *Prevent* due to confusion in earlier editions.¹⁸³ By making this term clearer, the UK hoped to improve both its internal delineation of responsibilities for actions, as well as its relationship with the public. *Prevent* is clearly labeled as a security-driven plan, and the British Government wants the public to understand that security (specifically regarding terrorism) is not the driver of other strategies, particularly integration.

To make this point abundantly clear, the British government devised a separate (but related) strategy for integration titled *Creating the Conditions for Integration* (CCI), a product of the Department for Communities and Local Government. CCI seeks to promote five factors that the British believe lead to integration:

¹⁷⁸ Home Office, “Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST),” accessed April 27, 2012, <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/counter-terrorism-strategy/>.

¹⁷⁹ United Kingdom, *Prevent Strategy*, Home Office (publication CM8092), 2011, 2–5.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid, 1.

¹⁸² Communities and Local Government, “Creating the Conditions for Integration – Communities and neighbourhoods – Department for Communities and Local Government,” accessed April 27, 2012, <http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/communities/integration>.

¹⁸³ United Kingdom, *Prevent Strategy*, 2.

1. Common ground—A clear sense of shared aspirations and values, which focuses on what we have in common rather than our differences.
2. Responsibility—A strong sense of our mutual commitments and obligations, which brings personal and social responsibility.
3. Social mobility—People able to realize their potential to get on in life.
4. Participation and empowerment—People of all backgrounds have the opportunities to take part, be heard and take decisions in local and national life.
5. Tackling intolerance and extremism—A robust response to threats, whether discrimination, extremism or disorder, that deepen division and increase tensions.¹⁸⁴

Some of the sensitivities to the confusion between *Prevent* and the UK's integration strategy came as a result of speaking with stakeholders about the implementation of the old *Prevent* strategy, and concerns about covert domestic espionage. The British were careful, however, not to discount the impact that integration and *Prevent* have on each other. *Prevent* and CCI reference each other, and describe how they each work together. Neither plan can encompass the other's mission, but neither will be effective without careful implementation of the other.

B. DEFINITION OF COMMUNITY

Chapters I and II reviewed research supporting the notion that the method used to define “community” can have a significant impact on the success of the engagement. The literature further concluded that different types of communities require different strategies to effectively build trust. This section will analyze the effectiveness of the programs in relation to their definition of community, their ability to recognize different definitions, and their treatment of anomic neighborhoods.

¹⁸⁴ Communities and Local Government, *Creating the conditions for integration*, 2012, 5.

1. Chicago—Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy

CAPS is a geographically-based method of community engagement. The Chicago Police Department organizes itself into twenty-five police districts, which are further divided into 279 police beats.¹⁸⁵ These beats are the simplest definition of “community” for CAPS. The majority of the community engagement in the CAPS structure happens when residents and officers conduct problem-solving exercise at beat-level meetings. District advisory committees, composed of the community beat team facilitators (citizen leaders for each beat) and community stakeholders, work together and explore/problem solve broader district-level trends. Beat meetings are held monthly, but collaboration has expanded beyond the confines of the CAPS structure, as new groups have developed and meet independently of the beat work. These groups include “block clubs, neighborhood watch groups, marches and rallies.”¹⁸⁶

The CAPS attendance figures cited in the “Background” section indicate that the definition for community has been successful in many areas, but lacking with some demographics. The evaluation *CAPS at Ten* found that the strategy was successfully reaching Caucasians and African-Americans. This information is supported by a survey, as well as anecdotal stories contained throughout the CAPS literature, particularly in an earlier evaluation, *CAPS at Five*. The difficulty, however, seems to be the obstacles to CAPS’ success in Latino communities; not only did they not fare as well, but evaluator Wesley Skogan noted that conditions in Latino areas actually deteriorated.¹⁸⁷ The *CAPS at Ten* survey found a much lower participation rate among Latinos, and several reasons were proposed in the report: Many Latinos in Chicago had poor experiences with police in their home nations (often corruption and/or abuse), and this impacted their willingness to trust American police; language differences that led to communications issues were a concern; and questions about the legal status of many Latinos, whether founded or not,

¹⁸⁵ City of Chicago, *CAPS at Five*, 6.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 7.

¹⁸⁷ Wesley G. Skogan, *Police and Community in Chicago: A Tale of Three Cities*, New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, 21.

put a strain on the relationship.¹⁸⁸ The language barrier appears to have been especially significant, as Spanish-speaking Latinos were found to be less likely to call the police about their concerns, even though they make up a disproportionately high percentage of residents in areas that could be considered anomie.¹⁸⁹

Overall, the Chicago strategy for outreach seems to have had less of an impact on improving the relationship with the Latino community than other groups. However, this still highlights a difficulty facing Chicago's engagement process. The ability to tie the success (or lack thereof in Latino communities) of CAPS to ethnicity also indicates that by using a geographically-based method of defining community, ethnic delineations may also be incorporated, as certain neighborhoods contain concentrations of particular ethnicities.

2. Philadelphia—The PhillyRising Collaborative

The PhillyRising strategy defines communities as geographic areas (neighborhoods). The selection of these neighborhoods begins with nominations from the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD). Based on their experiences with community involvement in the Police Services Areas (PSA), officers nominate locations that they believe have chronic crime and quality of life issues. Nominations are evaluated by the PPD for density of Part I Crime, and areas that are determined to have a high concentration are sent to PhillyRising staff for consideration. As is the case in Chicago, these neighborhoods may also be dominated by a particular ethnic group.

After location nomination, PhillyRising staff conducts an evaluation of other data sources, including: income levels, percentage of residents living below the poverty level, number of vacant properties, litter index, 311 calls for service, and health data. When the data is compiled, PhillyRising staff and the PPD work together to determine which neighborhoods have the confluence of crime and low quality of life indicators that make

¹⁸⁸ Skogan and Steiner, *CAPS at Ten*, vii.

¹⁸⁹ Skogan, *Police and Community in Chicago*.

neighborhoods qualify for PhillyRising. These criteria are roughly based on the model depicted by Nolan, Conti, and McDevitt described in Chapter I of this thesis.

Part of the selection process involves determining the boundaries of the neighborhood. In Philadelphia, neighborhoods are not always clearly demarcated, and choosing these lines has caused controversy on several occasions. A relatively lax treatment of boundary lines has aided in alleviating tensions over inclusion. After boundaries are settled and neighborhoods chosen, they are prioritized to determine which are of the greatest need.

The selection process serves a twofold purpose: first, it sets a limit to the size of the area (typically .15 square miles or smaller, roughly an area four by five city blocks), which is important when allocating limited resources. Secondly, the use of small neighborhoods appears to serve as a way of rallying residents around a common sense of community. Physical boundaries have also provided central locations, including schools and recreational facilities, which residents have rallied around for improvement. Despite the occasional minor controversy over the inclusion of a particular street, this strategy has successfully brought residents of different races, religions, and income levels together to work collaboratively with city government. While this process limits inclusion to a degree, it may help ensure outreach to a wide variety of communities, so that few high-risk areas are excluded, as was recommended in the literature review.

Focusing on physical space has also seemingly preempted overt concerns about domestic espionage. While community members have anecdotally seemed skeptical about the level of commitment on behalf of the city, or on the ability to deliver a coordinated service approach, reception of the strategy has generally been favorable. Some communities that have not been selected have actively petitioned to have their neighborhood included in PhillyRising. This desire for inclusion clearly denotes a favorable impression by some segments of the population, and indicates strong potential for “walk-ins”¹⁹⁰ who volunteer public safety information to authorities.

¹⁹⁰ For more detail, see Chapter II, C. Trust and Engagement.”

The focus of the PhillyRising selection process is generally to act as a proactive model for engagement—it does not wait for a major event, but instead focuses on areas that are high-risk for violent criminal behavior. A valid counterargument would be that PhillyRising is at least somewhat reactive, in that it selects areas that already have a high density of this behavior. It can also be argued that because PhillyRising staff is willing to work with ex-offenders, the approach has not prevented these individuals from committing crimes. However, the overall goal is to support positive efforts in the community, which is designed to attract at least some individuals from choosing a path of violence, as well as to support those who are interested in leaving a violent path. The process also promotes the notion of procedural justice,¹⁹¹ in that it gives these residents a voice in the decision-making process for their neighborhood.

3. Los Angeles Police Department

LAPD engagement regarding counterterrorism clearly defines the “community” as the Muslim population of Los Angeles. This definition caused concern in 2007 when LAPD leadership made an effort to orient their outreach strategy based on the locations of Muslim communities in Los Angeles. LAPD undertook an effort to plot the communities on a map, with the intention of finding moderate Muslim voices within these communities. This notion was similar to some aspects of the Prevent strategy from the United Kingdom.¹⁹²

However, the effort was seen as an attempt by the LAPD to conduct illegal intelligence collection and surveillance activities on the Muslim population. The story received widespread media attention, and the project was dubbed “Muslim Mapping.”¹⁹³ The backlash from the story was so severe that the mapping aspect of the program was terminated approximately one week after it was announced.¹⁹⁴ Outreach to the Muslim

¹⁹¹ See Chapter I, Literature Review.

¹⁹² Fishman and Lebovich, “Countering Domestic Radicalization,” 17.

¹⁹³ Winton, Watanabe, and Krikorian, “LAPD Defends Muslim Mapping Effort.”

¹⁹⁴ Richard Winton and Teresa Watanabe, “LAPD’s Muslim Mapping Plan Killed,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 15, 2007, accessed April 21, 2012, <http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/15/local/me-muslim15>.

community, minus the mapping component, continues today. The quality of outreach, as demonstrated through the awards received by LAPD for their counterterrorism unit, were of little concern, as the perception of the strategy alienated the Muslim community before any exercises began to build trust. Giving the Muslim population a voice in how the outreach was advertised, as suggested by research describing how procedural justice can improve counterterrorism operations,¹⁹⁵ may have stemmed the backlash caused by this incident.

4. The United Kingdom—Prevent

The focus of the British strategy is consistent and reinforced throughout *Prevent*. Within the general realm of counterterrorism, *Prevent* repeatedly states that it is mainly geared toward dealing with Al Qaeda and its affiliates, with general references to violent acts based on Islamic extremism.¹⁹⁶ While the strategy briefly mentions issues related to terrorism from right-wing groups and those associated with “the struggles” in Northern Ireland, the Home Office is careful to note that these sources of terrorism are not the target audience for *Prevent*. However, the document does not rule out that some tactics may be applied to each type of group, and that current British counterterrorism strategy has been significantly impacted by operations in Northern Ireland. The community for *Prevent*, then, is the British Muslim population.

Based on the focusing on Islamic extremism, two other prominent themes emerge from *Prevent*—deradicalization and the use of funding. A deradicalized terrorist is one who has renounced a violent ideology, assumed a moderate ideology, and may be willing to participate peacefully in society.¹⁹⁷ The Home Office notes that deradicalization programs are largely unproven, a condition that is recognized by other studies as well—with the relatively short life span of programs focused on deradicalization (few have

¹⁹⁵ Schulhofer et al., “American Policing.”

¹⁹⁶ United Kingdom, *Prevent Strategy*.

¹⁹⁷ ICT’s Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group Insights, “The De-Radicalization Process,” 2.

existed for more than ten years), more long-term research is needed to determine the ultimate success of such programs.¹⁹⁸ However, *Prevent* goes on to note that the possibility for success is worth the effort.¹⁹⁹

As for the use of funding, the UK notes that several expenditures under previous *Prevent* efforts had been questionable—accusations surrounded the idea that some had funded the very types of radical groups that counterterrorism operations are designed to intercept.²⁰⁰ The Home Office responds to these accusations by noting that money will only be granted to organizations that share basic British values.

The British strategy, however, also brings recognition that engagement will take different forms based on the conditions of each community. The British government is generally geared toward localism, and delegates much of the specific work of the engagement to coordinators based in municipalities (this idea will be explored further in the “Engagement Tactics” section that follows). This demonstrates recognition that the British see engagement as being influenced by geographically-based factors, and that some degree of customization is necessary for each community, or at least each municipality.

5. Comparative Analysis

While the cases do not use a universally-accepted means of defining community, there are some consistent traits across each entity. The first is the existence of some type of geographic influence on the definition of community (though this is weakest in the Case of Los Angeles). Each of the systems relies on existing geographic divisions created by municipalities. In the cases of the local strategies (Chicago and Philadelphia), social and political networks are leveraged to reach what is in many cases an already organized community. The local municipalities recognize that the existing structure is an effective tool to begin engagement, and that there is no need to impose artificial structures that

¹⁹⁸ Porges, “The Saudi Deradicalization Experiment.”

¹⁹⁹ United Kingdom, *Prevent Strategy*.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

may not be accepted by residents. The British national strategy essentially recognizes the same lesson—that local governments have a better understanding of local dynamics than the national government, so resources are pushed down to enhance the local engagement program.

The primary difference between the Chicago/Philadelphia strategies and the LAPD/British is their specific focus on Islamic communities. CAPS and PhillyRising used systems that were more subtle in their process of engagement—Chicago’s plan engages all of its communities, and the Philadelphia system determines the areas based on levels of crime.²⁰¹ The local models seem to have a more objective approach, and can rely on data rather than a personal identifier (religion). The objective approach leaves less room for accusations of profiling by government entities, as evidenced by the lack of outcries of profiling and/or domestic spying in the Chicago/Philadelphia models, while Prevent has been attacked by various groups throughout Britain, and LAPD had to entirely abandon their mapping component. While it is unlikely that many municipalities would be able to undertake engagement efforts in all parts of their jurisdiction, and it is unclear that crime or low quality of life are indicators of radicalization (though there is more evidence that procedural justice plays a role), a combination of objectivity and practicality may produce a balanced approach.

Further research is needed to identify which factors (if any) make a community more susceptible to radicalization. If those factors can be determined and then mapped, a practical, objective method for selecting engagement could be established. This may also reduce claims of violations of civil liberties, if the criteria are seen as fair. Transparency and simplicity in the selection process have aided in the local acceptance of the Chicago and Philadelphia efforts. The three examples also demonstrate the need for customizing outreach approaches for success beyond initial acceptance. After initial acceptance, each program may improve by determining which groups are not being reached, and alter engagement strategies to explore a more comprehensive approach.

²⁰¹ The Philadelphia Police Department’s Police Service Areas, however, do engage residents in all areas of the city, but only areas that are also included in PhillyRising currently receive the coordinated support of other city agencies.

C. ENGAGEMENT TACTICS

This section evaluates criteria from Chapter II found under the headings “the Need for True Prevention” and “Trust and Engagement.” The analysis focuses on the degree to which the programs successfully built trust with their communities, what the role of the government was in the process, whether the programs focused their efforts on preventing violence (versus operating reactively), and the programs’ ability to sustain a discussion that included issues beyond direct security concerns.

1. Chicago—Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy

The implementation of CAPS began with a change to police dispatching policy in 1993: officers were assigned to their beats (the smallest geographically-based service area in the Chicago Police Department) for longer periods of time, a concept called Beat Integrity. Ideally, Beat Integrity enabled officers to gain a more thorough understanding of the neighborhoods they patrol, as well as the people they serve and protect.²⁰² This strategy is in line with Bach and Kaufman’s research on building social trust—the Chicago Police were able to improve their level of trust with community members through frequent interactions in contexts other than a criminal incident.

The second element of the CAPS strategy comes in the community involvement. Regular meetings (monthly) are held in each beat,²⁰³ providing a customized and prioritized discussion around each neighborhood. In addition to a customized approach, CAPS includes a fundamental recognition that poor and minority communities may have a weak “civic infrastructure,” what Nolan, Conti, and McDevitt refer to as collective efficacy. The CAPS approach calls for the police in Chicago to take a role in building some of this infrastructure, and this has been accomplished with heavy public involvement.²⁰⁴

²⁰² City of Chicago, *CAPS at Five*, 5.

²⁰³ Ibid., 6.

²⁰⁴ Skogan, *Police and Community in Chicago*, 102.

The third aspect brings the power of city agencies other than the police to assist with local quality of life problems. To accomplish this, the City of Chicago implemented “special procedures” to improve work flow and coordination between agencies and the police department.²⁰⁵

Finally, the fourth step, collaborative problem solving, brings the other aspects of the strategy together. The Chicago Police Department used a five step model for problem solving to facilitate discussions. The five steps are as follows:

1. Identify and Prioritize
2. Analyze
3. Design Strategies
4. Implement
5. Evaluate and Acknowledge Success²⁰⁶

This model intends for the police and residents to jointly identify issues on their beat, and then work together through the five step process to propose/develop solutions. The coordinated work of other city services is intended to contribute to the strategies created through the problem solving process.²⁰⁷ The nature of the five steps of this process allows the community, police, and other city agencies to identify problems unique to each neighborhood and create solutions that can be implemented and monitored for effectiveness. The process also addresses another problem referenced by Skogan in his evaluation—crime can cause trust to erode between community members as well as with government.²⁰⁸ Problem solving served as a strategy to rebuild trust among all participants.

Bringing CAPS to each neighborhood in Chicago supports a strong argument for the strategy to be considered proactive—CAPS does not wait for a specific event or

²⁰⁵ City of Chicago, *CAPS at Five*, 6.

²⁰⁶ Skogan and Steiner, *CAPS at Ten*, 89.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Skogan, *Police and Community in Chicago*, 114.

enumerated conditions to trigger outreach. This is consistent with the goals stated in CAPS promotional materials as well as evaluations, as the notion of prevention is frequently cited.

The strategy has shown an overall indication that it has improved the trust and general relationship between residents and their city government, particularly the police department. *CAPS at Ten* cites several statistics that support this trend, particularly the large turnout for meetings over a ten-year period (as described in the Background section). The survey described in *CAPS at Ten* also indicates that while there are still racial divisions, the overall perception of the Chicago Police is improving and a large portion of Chicagoans have responded positively to the strategy.²⁰⁹ The review also gave specific grades to individual aspects of CAPS: “public involvement,” which includes participation, as well as the structure and direction of beat and district advisory committee meetings, received a “B,” “agency partnerships” and “reorganization,” both measures of reforms within and among government entities, each received an “A,” finally, the “problem-solving” component received a “C,” as some local problems seemed to persist annually.²¹⁰ While the problem-solving process may be more effective if more concrete results are produced, the problems addressed in beat meetings may not have simple solutions in an urban environment. Furthermore, the positive rankings of the other aspects indicate that the problem-solving process itself is having a positive impact on the relationship between the community and government.

2. Philadelphia—The PhillyRising Collaborative

The PhillyRising engagement process begins with staff members listening to the concerns and goals of the selected community. To acquire this information, the staff reaches out to a diverse array of stakeholders including: city departments and employees, elected officials, academic institutions, independent organizations (both non- and for-

²⁰⁹ Skogan and Steiner, *CAPS at Ten*, iv.

²¹⁰ Ibid., vii–x.

profit), community anchors,²¹¹ and local residents. Together, these organizations form a “community” that work together in specific neighborhoods. The stakeholders are engaged in person, both in standing meetings held by stakeholders, as well as larger collaborations held by PhillyRising staff. Meetings hosted by PhillyRising staff often include a “show of force” by city agencies, to demonstrate the level of commitment to the selected area.

The tangible result of the meetings is typically the identification of action items that serve as goals for high-priority concerns (both geographic and issue-based) of residents. Discussions then focus on determining which agencies can support the concerns, and which community members are willing to manage implementation. The proposed solutions are compiled into an action plan, which includes specific deadlines and assignments of personnel to individual tasks. This document provides both a plan for the community, as well as a basis for measuring progress. In a symbolic gesture signifying agreement on the first draft of the action plan, a representative from each organization signs the plan, committing their resources to proposed solutions. This method allows PhillyRising to customize its tactics in each neighborhood, a strategy strongly supported by the literature. The process also includes a strong emphasis on procedural justice, as residents are included in identifying problems and implementing solutions.

As items have been completed on action plans, PhillyRising staff has seen an improvement in the trust they receive from residents. This trust has manifest itself through the identification of more complex problems (faith in staff abilities), access to information that would not otherwise be shared with “outsiders,” and occasionally information of a sensitive criminal nature. In one neighborhood, after several months of engagement, PhillyRising staff was told of a dead tree that was used to store narcotics. City staff quickly removed the tree, and residents saw a significant reduction in the presence of drug dealers in the vicinity. This level of trust was only facilitated after staff proved that they were both competent and working in the best interest of the

²¹¹ PhillyRising staff define community anchors are defined here as stable, recognizable institutions, organizations, or facilities that help to define a specific neighborhood.

neighborhood. Similar to what was seen in Chicago, this supports Bach et al.’s findings that frequent, positive interactions are effective at building trust with residents.

PhillyRising staff has also worked to create mechanisms to educate residents and create a comfortable environment for sharing ideas. One such mechanism, the Citizens’ Engagement Academy (CEA) is a series of workshops brought to PhillyRising neighborhoods. Participants typically meet once a week for eight weeks in a classroom setting. Each week features different presenters, who range from heads of city departments to representatives from large nonprofit organizations and federal agencies. CEA is not utilized in communities that are new to the PhillyRising process, but instead in areas where trust has already developed. Meetings are held in politically neutral locations, and participants are selected by PhillyRising staff based on the level of commitment they have shown to the neighborhood. Ground rules are set for an academic environment, so that both participants and presenters understand that they are there to learn from each other. This has been particularly helpful in comforting presenters, as their audience is prepared and ready to be informed, rather than irate about recent issues that they may perceive as handled poorly. CEA has also created a space where residents are comfortable interacting with agencies that may otherwise receive a negative reaction due to their law enforcement or prosecutorial disposition (Police, District Attorney, U.S. Attorney, etc.).

The PhillyRising process is also designed to improve government performance. Historically, Philadelphia’s departments have focused their measures of success internally with little coordination. The PhillyRising model encourages managers to meet regularly to identify overlapping problems and develop and deliver collaborative solutions to long-term, complex issues. As the departments adapt to serving residents in this manner, PhillyRising may create a means for right-sizing government resources and departmental structures.

The model is also designed to shift the determination for departmental success from strictly internal measures to actual outcomes seen in focus neighborhoods—geographic accountability for service delivery. Providing services based on common

geographic boundaries may cause a fundamental shift in how most departments in city government conduct their business. Functionally, this is intended require city agencies to work with the community on problem solving and coordinating with other city services to deliver public safety.

3. The United Kingdom—Prevent

Localization is at the heart of *Prevent's* tactics. The UK strategy specifically outlines the relationship between the central and local governments, which has a significant impact on where tactics for engagement are executed. The British government in general operates in an environment that attempts to localize power and effort as much as possible.²¹² *Prevent* makes it clear that localities are at the center of combatting terrorism, particularly due to the specialized knowledge of local employees such as police officers. However, *Prevent* also recognizes that the “central departments” must maintain a degree of coordination around these efforts, as they pertain to national security.²¹³

The British engagement structure is also dictated by the control of counterterrorism funding. This dichotomy allows for a degree of balance between the centralized coordination and local customization of tactics.

The British are also clear about the role of local government in their counterterrorism strategy—policing is frequently mentioned, as is the power to decide how local programs are implemented. This shapes the relationship between the levels of government—although *Prevent* coordinators are funded by the Home Office (to retain a degree of central training and coordination²¹⁴), the coordinators’ place within the structure of local government is determined by the locality to which they are assigned.²¹⁵

²¹² Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism,” 51.

²¹³ United Kingdom, *Prevent Strategy*, 6.

²¹⁴ Ibid., 32.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 97.

This tactic supports the notion that local governments are best positioned to determine how to implement *Prevent*, and that the Home Office is willing to underwrite this structure with resources and oversight.

While the relationship between the levels of government is an important aspect of *Prevent*, community members themselves are at the heart of the strategy:

Communities are expected to play an active role in countering radicalization by developing support functions that provide positive options to those who may be vulnerable to recruitment. Such individuals regularly come into contact with government officials (including but not limited to law enforcement), community workers, or religious figures.²¹⁶

The language supports the notion of encouraging interaction with residents to promote trust, but the strategy has received mixed reactions from the public. Critics have argued against some of *Prevent*'s policies and tactics, and the most recent governmental review of the strategy recognizes that “the previous *Prevent* programme we inherited from the last government was flawed.”²¹⁷

In response, the UK has developed “safeguards” that *Prevent* describes as being necessary to stop the government from abusing power. The protection of civil liberties, particularly in the context of free speech, is one such concern that is repeated in the document.²¹⁸ There are also calls for safeguards against activities that may be perceived as government spying, a concern that was noted as part of the review process. While the commentary from the review notes that there was no evidence of abuse of the data collected on individuals as part of *Prevent*, the Home Office notes that the perception of wrongdoing is a problem.²¹⁹ To combat this, safeguards for ensuring transparency, particularly on the use of data, is reinforced throughout the document.²²⁰ To help ensure objectivity in the implementation of the safeguards, the Department of Community and

²¹⁶ Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism,” 47.

²¹⁷ Home Office, “The Prevent strategy,” accessed April 27, 2012, <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/review-of-prevent-strategy/>.

²¹⁸ United Kingdom, *Prevent Strategy*.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Ibid.

Local Government, which is responsible for work surrounding integration policy (described in the “Background” section), was selected to oversee the implementation of several precautionary measures. Although challenges have come in the public perception of *Prevent*, the British strategy has ultimately seen multiple successes, including instances where members of the Muslim community have contacted British authorities to report other Muslims who were involved in terror plots.²²¹ The fact that terror plots were reported rather than perpetrators of terrorist acts demonstrates that the strategy may be living up to its name, as it prevented these attacks.

Unlike the Chicago and Philadelphia cases, the UK does not continue the larger conversation of quality of life in *Prevent* (it is separated to *Creating the Conditions for Integration, CCI*). However, the Home Office recognizes that *CCI* and *Prevent* have a significant impact on each other, and so a discussion beyond direct security concerns can happen within the *Prevent* structure.

4. Comparative Analysis

As was the case with the “Definition of Community,” the tactics across the three cases show some consistent themes that contributed to success. The first and most prevalent of these themes is flexibility in the engagement system. Each program allows a high degree of customization to local context—CAPS and PhillyRising produce neighborhood-specific plans, and Prevent allows the local municipality to determine the most effective means for implementation. This flexibility allows the models to utilize consistent principles and practices, but in a method that allows for local factors that may otherwise prevent a more rigid model from achieving success in different communities.

A second theme is that each of the programs puts the focus community the center of operations. Each entity provides a space where they can work to understand the community’s needs and then develop plans that are responsive to those needs. The

²²¹ Jay Edwards and Benoit Gomis, *Islamic Terrorism in the UK since 9/11: Reassessing the “Soft” Response*, London: Chatham House, 2011.

responsiveness can provide a mechanism to demonstrate to residents that the government is actively participating in the process, and that the process is being led by local concerns.

The governments in each case demonstrate that they understand these concerns by providing coordinated responses that involve the improvement to the quality of life of each of these areas. It should be noted that policing plays a role in each, but law enforcement is never the only entity involved. Involving agencies beyond the traditional homeland security or public safety realm may contribute to the reduction of concerns of domestic spying, and the antinomy described by Philip Bobbit.²²² Of the three programs, however, only the PhillyRising has not suffered any accusations of civil liberty violations. While the length of time the program has been in operation is clearly a possible factor for this, the program's location in an office that oversees issues beyond security/safety concerns may play a role in the public's perception of the program's intent.

None of the models leave the work exclusively to the governments—each involves a degree of community participation. The three systems create atmospheres where problem-solving is encouraged. CAPS appears to be the most obvious about advertising this aspect with its five step process, but the Philadelphia and UK models share similar principles. The notion of residents and governments working as partners in a collaborative, participatory process has been demonstrated to build trust.²²³

The strategies also share the notion of a bidirectional flow of information. Traditional government outreach programs have employed a top-down approach²²⁴—they essentially exist to serve as a mechanism for government to provide a message and/or service to its residents. There is often no mechanism for residents to respond to that message through official channels. Each of the strategies here employs tactics that are not only open to, but reliant on information from the citizenry. Each attempts to open a line of communication that allows the government to understand the needs of its

²²² Bobbit, *Terror and Consent*.

²²³ Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations*.

²²⁴ Bach et al., "Policy Challenges in Supporting Community Resilience."

citizens, and customize a responsive message to address those concerns. This has, in some cases, led these programs to pursue internal reforms (both to their specific program as well as other entities) based on the information received from the public. These reforms are evidence that the systems contain aspects of procedural justice, as residents were active participants whose input had an influence on governmental policies and procedures.

D. COST/RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND EVALUATION

1. Chicago—Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy

CAPS is allocated approximately \$4,700,000 in the 2012 Chicago budget.²²⁵ This figure accounts for the salaries of fifty staff in the CAPS Implementation Office, which is charged with “Increases awareness among Chicago residents by enhancing partnerships between community and institutional stakeholders, police, and other City agencies. Monitors and assesses the delivery of services and stimulates participation in relevant programs and functions.”²²⁶ This figure does not account for the two police officers and one sergeant that are assigned to CAPS duties in each police district,²²⁷ nor does it account for the services delivered by other city agencies.

As evidenced by the reports referenced thus far about CAPS, there was a strong evaluation component in place through 2004. The Institute for Policy Research, an organization within Northwestern University, was independently monitoring the progress of CAPS²²⁸ (this included the evaluation by Wesley Skogan). Their evaluations can be found throughout CAPS documentation. However, no public evaluations of CAPS can be found after *CAPS at Ten*,²²⁹ which was published in January 2004.

²²⁵ Mayor Rahm Emanuel, *Budget 2012 Overview*: City of Chicago, 2012.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Michael J. Mealer, personal correspondence with the author, email dated April 21, 2012.

²²⁸ Northwestern University Institute for Policy Research, “IPR Publications, Community Policing,” accessed April 21, 2012, <http://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/publications/policing.html>.

²²⁹ Save for Skogan’s book, which included research through the same period, though was not published until 2006.

2. Philadelphia—The PhillyRising Collaborative

PhillyRising is specifically designed to be cost efficient. Instead of adding funding to neighborhoods, existing resources are coordinated and re-prioritized to maximize efficiency. These resources include over sixty departments from the City of Philadelphia, as well as over one hundred organizations from outside of city government, including nonprofit organizations, for-profit corporations, academic institutions, and community development corporations.

For Fiscal Year 2012, the PhillyRising budget was approximately \$500,000.²³⁰ The funding covers the salaries of a program director and six divisional coordinators. The divisional coordinators are the primary points of contact for each PhillyRising neighborhood, and responsible for overseeing service delivery and facilitating problem solving in those areas.

While the PhillyRising budget does not include funding beyond staffing, the staff coordinates a significant sum of resources. It is estimated that PhillyRising staff coordinated the delivery of approximately \$614,000 worth of city services between February 23, 2010 and February 10, 2012. Resources were also coordinated from other organizations, including staff time from federal agencies, as well as repurposed funding from the City of Philadelphia's Office of the Inspector General—the results of an investigation into another city agency by the Office of the Inspector General produced \$107,600 in gift cards that are now being used by PhillyRising staff to support community initiatives.²³¹

The effectiveness of PhillyRising is measured independently through PhillyStat sessions. As taken from the City of Philadelphia's website, "PhillyStat is the City of Philadelphia's performance management program. During PhillyStat meetings, City leaders review departmental performance metrics and progress toward the Mayor's

²³⁰ Fiscal Year 2012 for the City of Philadelphia encompassed July 1, 2011–June 30, 2012.

²³¹ Philadelphia Office of the Inspector General, "Division of Technology Deputy Fired for Exploiting City's Verizon Contract," accessed April 27, 2012, <http://philadelphiainspectorgeneral.wordpress.com/2011/07/20/division-of-technology-deputy-fired-for-exploiting-citys-verizon-contract/>.

strategic goals.”²³² In PhillyStat sessions, PhillyRising staff meets with governmental leaders to discuss quality of life and crime trends within individual neighborhoods and across the PhillyRising scope of operations.

3. The United Kingdom—Prevent

From 2008–2011, funding for *Prevent* was based in the Department for Communities and Local Government. During that period,²³³ £22,253,169 (\$34,766,126²³⁴) was spent annually in payments to local organizations (including governments) to prevent violent extremism.²³⁵ At the beginning of the 2011–2012 fiscal year, the total budget for *Prevent* was estimated to include between £36,000,000 and £46,000,000 from the Home Office and £10,000,000 from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.²³⁶ These figures, which are tremendously higher than the cost of the other strategies, shows how a national strategy that requires the creation of new programs can quickly mount in cost.

Though more expensive, *Prevent* also has a far more detailed system for evaluation than the American strategies. The current version of Prevent is itself the result of an extensive outreach process that asked residents about their experience with British counterterrorism efforts. The outreach included an online survey, “consultation events” held across the UK, and focus group meetings.²³⁷ To maintain transparency in the review process, the Home Office went so far as to publish the results of these meetings

²³² City of Philadelphia, “City of Philadelphia Performance Management,” accessed April 27, 2012, http://www.phila.gov/performance/Philly_Stat.html.

²³³ The UK fiscal year runs from April 1 through March 31.

²³⁴ Using conversion rate at the time of writing.

²³⁵ Communities and Local Government, “Prevent Funding – Corporate – Department of Communities and Local Government,” accessed April 27, 2012, <http://www.communities.gov.uk/corporate/foi/disclosure-log/disclosurelog2011/jul2011/preventfunding/>.

²³⁶ Home Office, “New Prevent Strategy Launched,” accessed April 27, 2012, <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/media-centre/news/prevent-strategy>.

²³⁷ United Kingdom, *Prevent Strategy*.

on their website.²³⁸ The current strategy was also completed after a review of the old Prevent by Lord Carlile of Berriew, highly-decorated senior member of the Queen's Counsel.²³⁹ Lord Carlile contributed both to the forward of Prevent itself, as well as his own shorter report with specific comments he thought should accompany the formal document.²⁴⁰

4. Comparative Analysis

The most fundamental resource seen across these strategies is staffing. The three rely on a dedicated cadre of staff that is involved in learning the intricacies of their communities and coordinating service delivery. While the scale of the staffing varies, people are at the heart of each program. While the documentation reviewed here did not include information about the particular qualities of the staff for each program, it is logical to assume that selecting appropriate staff would be an important aspect of the process. These staffers become the face of the strategy (and government in a larger sense) to their communities, so their social skills, as well as their ability to operate complex logistical operations would be critical to success.

There is also consistency in the use of resources outside of the homeland security/public safety realm. These strategies each contain some component of quality of life improvement, which is not likely to be housed in the budget of a police department or Home Office. The source of this support often comes from other entities within the government, but on several occasions resources are coordinated or procured that are sources from outside entities. The burden of cost is further distributed in the UK by the different levels of government involved: the national government provides the funding for the staff support, but local services are handled through local budgets. As is the case

²³⁸ Home Office, "The Prevent Strategy," accessed April 27, 2012, <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/review-of-prevent-strategy/>.

²³⁹ BBC News, "New Year Honours: Anti-terror Adviser Lord Carlile's CBE," accessed April 27, 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-mid-wales-16366687>.

²⁴⁰ Alex Carlile, *Report to the Home Secretary of Independent Oversight of Prevent Review and Strategy*. London: HM Government, 2011.

in Philadelphia, these are not necessarily additions to the existing departmental budgets, but more frequently use existing resources in a more coordinated fashion.

The programs also utilize resources from outside of government. While CAPS and PhillyRising have documented the involvement of nonprofit organizations, corporations, universities, and other large-scale partners, the use of community resources is consistent in all three. Finding ways to supplement physical resources, as well as utilizing local populations for their skills and ability to volunteer staffing for projects, adds value to each proposition and shows a greater return on investment of tax dollars versus single-funding source projects. This adds to the sustainability of potential solutions, as well as a stronger argument for the program's affordability, particularly during a worldwide recession.

In terms of evaluation, the Chicago and Philadelphia models have aspects that are replicable in municipalities that can support moderate to robust performance management plans. The British system for evaluation, however, has lessons that can be taken on a broader national context in terms of how the U.S. evaluates its larger strategy for Countering Violent Extremism. Although the U.S. government is based on a system of checks and balances, *ELP* and *SIP* have no identified path for oversight. This is necessary for the plan (and its success or lack thereof) to maintain legitimacy and achieve support from the diverse groups of stakeholders that would be impacted by the U.S. Strategy. The balance of housing *Prevent* in the Home Office, but with oversight from *CCI* (as described in the “Background” section) provide a model that independently evaluates progress without being overly cumbersome.

A summary of the findings of this chapter can be seen in Table 3–1.

Table 3–1. Summary of Lessons from Chapter III

The programs have a geographic component in how they define communities, and using characteristics such as race or religion can have negative associations with profiling or domestic espionage.	Quality of life is frequently discussed in addition to direct physical safety concerns.
Local governments are recognized as having the strongest connections to communities.	Information and services should flow bi-directionally between residents and government.
Successful programs have flexible engagement tactics that can be customized to a variety of communities and situations.	Resources should be focused primarily on staffing.
Community members drive successful engagement programs, rather than the government.	Staffing and support services should extend beyond the public safety/homeland security enterprise.

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IV. THE RISING SYSTEM

The previous chapter analyzed several citizen engagement programs that are intended to provide a benefit to public safety and homeland security. The purpose of this chapter is to take lessons from those studies and propose a structure for federal outreach that would ultimately make communities safer.

A. THE RISING SYSTEM

The U.S. federal system, in particular DHS, is a centrally-organized, military-style bureaucracy²⁴¹ that is not designed to connect with communities in a decentralized way. This is evidenced by the review of federal engagement programs discussed in the literature review found Chapter I. The systems in Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles each provide solid outreach models, but none have a formal connection with the federal government. For the U.S. federal government to engage communities with effectiveness more similar to the case studies, a new system is necessary to connect with the American public. This may be accomplished with a domestic coordination and engagement system, which will be referred to as the “Rising System” for the purposes of this thesis.

The goal of the Rising System is threefold: to link federal, state, and local governments (collectively, “government”); to build on existing community policing and outreach efforts to help at-risk communities identify their greatest challenges; and to provide a forum where community members can safely work with their government to develop solutions. The Rising System is a method for government service delivery where a single point of contact is designated as the liaison to a particular community. The use of a single point of contact avoids the confusion or residents dealing with multiple departments, and allows for an individual to build trust on both a personal and professional level. The liaison (or coordinator) would be responsible for gaining a thorough understanding of their focus community, and coordinating service delivery

²⁴¹ Bach and Kaufman, “A Social Infrastructure for Hometown Security.”

through various government agencies to improve quality of life and public safety. The Rising System would be geared toward fulfilling the need for a proactive public safety/homeland security strategy by working with existing engagement strategies to build a national network.

The Rising System's process would begin with the identification of communities that pose potential threats to public safety, which may be based on a number of reasons. Geography would play a central role in the definition of each community, but determining which are "at-risk" may involve a separate process. Once a community is selected, local government officials would then begin dialogue to gain a deeper understanding of the community, led by a single point of contact ("coordinator"). The coordinator would lead the development of strategies through which the government and the participants could work together to address issues identified by the community.

Though a simple idea, this runs counter to the traditional theory of government as a service provider. Instead of "big brother" knowing what is best for a community, the community would prioritize its own needs, and the coordinator would facilitate the delivery of resources. The goal of this process would be to build Bach et al.'s social trust²⁴² with the community. By listening to community members and delivering on promises, government representatives may be able to develop relationships that help these communities identify themselves as partners rather than adversaries.

Local governments are the logical choice to lead dialogue because in many cases they already have ties to either the selected communities, or second level connections through credible sources that could provide introductions. This notion is supported in the case studies by the United Kingdom's structure that allows local municipalities to customize a large degree of how their *Prevent* staffers are placed.

To support local efforts, the federal government would need to develop structures to organize the resources of various agencies involved. In Robert Deardorff's thesis *Countering Violent Extremism: the Challenge and the Opportunity*, he suggests the

²⁴² Bach et al., "Policy Challenges in Supporting Community Resilience."

federal government develop Regional Outreach and Operational Coordination Centers (ROOCC) to help coordinate engagement activities. Essentially, Deardorff envisions ROOCC as housing a wide variety of specialists to conduct outreach missions within the U.S.²⁴³ These specialists would include experts from counterterrorism, policing, and sociology—providing what Deardorff describes as a mix of “hard- and soft-power strategies.” The ROOCC could serve as the overarching mechanism to unite local outreach representatives with federal support in Rising Systems, and do so with a scope that connects security services with a wider range of government entities. The principle change to the ROOCC based on the studies reviewed for this thesis is the need for additional “experts” in various aspects of quality of life as addressed by other federal, state, and local agencies.

Alternatives to coordination through the ROOCC may include working groups based provide logical centers for activity, but their focus on intelligence, as well as fears that they are used for domestic espionage, make the ROOCC and U.S. Attorney’s Offices more palatable options.

B. ADDRESSING 9/11 AND MITIGATING THE ANTINOMIES

Conducted properly, the Rising System can help the U.S. address the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation to counter the terrorist narrative.²⁴⁴ By bringing at-risk communities into a partnership with the government, the U.S. would have subject matter experts to help refine how its message is conveyed. As is the case with deradicalization strategies, the use of respected members of focus communities to convey a message would be critical to this program’s success.²⁴⁵ These practices should ultimately lead to closer ties between the community and the government. Countering extremist and criminal ideology may help eliminate the flow of recruits to criminal organizations, which may contribute to their demise.

²⁴³ Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism.”

²⁴⁴ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*.

²⁴⁵ Porges, “The Saudi Deradicalization Experiment.”

An engagement strategy that builds relationships can also help to reduce the impact of several of the antinomies²⁴⁶ that Philip Bobbit describes in *Terror and Consent*, namely

- the separation between the domestic and the international”
- the different rules we apply to law enforcement and intelligence operations, and
- the different reliance we place on secret as opposed to open sources.²⁴⁷

Relationships with leaders in local communities can build trust, which may encourage them to volunteer sensitive information. This may help to eliminate, or at least reduce, the need for more invasive monitoring methods. In cases where more invasive monitoring is necessary, the volunteered information may provide the probable cause needed to justify such actions in a criminal or Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court, alleviating a concern associated with intelligence collection standards usually applied to foreign agents.

C. DEPLOYMENT OF RESOURCES

The Rising System would not demand a large amount of new funding, which is an important aspect for two reasons. First, significant financial investments are not practical or feasible for cash-strapped governments across the U.S. Second, directing money to specific groups could reward negative behaviors (i.e., if a group wants money from the government, they should threaten public safety). Instead, coordinators would be responsible for identifying existing organizations and programs (both inside and outside of government) that provide the services necessary to address the community’s needs. In some cases, focusing existing resources and implementing policy changes could prove to be small investments with a large return on improved security. By understanding communities more thoroughly, the government can improve its understanding of where

²⁴⁶ Phillip Bobbit uses the term “antinomies” to describe a series of six opposing legal regulations in the American system that, according to Bobbit, must be balanced to effectively protect the American homeland.

²⁴⁷ Bobbit, *Terror and Consent*, 296–297.

these types of investments may be found. In other cases, education campaigns may be the only step necessary, as some communities may not be aware of the extent of resources already at their disposal.

Reflecting the lessons from the case studies, the fundamental investment for Rising System would come in staffing, as coordinators would need to be added to work in focus areas. Experts from agencies, particularly federal, could be handled in one of two ways: existing employees could be assigned to the Rising System as an addition to their regular duties, with a renewed focus on where they direct efforts. Alternatively, new staff could be hired to serve as liaisons to the Rising System; or existing functions. In either case, liaison assignments would require knowledge of their agency's capabilities, as well as the gravitas to direct service delivery.

The Rising System would also help to inform government about how to best deploy resources in a difficult fiscal environment. By conducting the proper analysis of where grievances exist, government can provide opportunities where citizens leverage existing resources to improve their quality of life. Implementation of the Rising System may then aid in the shift to what Bobbit describes as a government in a "market state" rather than a "nation state."²⁴⁸ As community members utilize these resources and contribute to their neighborhood, they may also take ownership, potentially making them less likely to shield threats to security.

D. STAKEHOLDERS AND THEIR PERSPECTIVES

Those who stand to gain the most from a Rising System are the members of the focus communities. They would see an improved level of service in areas that may be described as underserved, poor, or forgotten. Local elected officials would benefit, as their knowledge of the community would play an important role in lending legitimacy to the program, and giving the group a sense of strong leadership. The Rising System's success would in turn lend local elected officials political capital as they bring improved quality of life to their community. However, it is possible that some elected officials

²⁴⁸ Bobbit, *Terror and Consent*, 85.

could view the Rising System as a threat to their constituent services functions. In this case, it would be imperative for the local coordinators to communicate how the concerns expressed to district offices can be resolved more effectively through partnership, and how this would benefit the district.

The homeland security enterprise in general would benefit from the Rising System, but certain organizations may oppose the idea. In theory, all members of the public safety and homeland security realms benefit from anything that reduces the number of threats. However, the proposal itself could be intimidating to some agencies, as it would force them to either evolve their missions, or reduce the need for their services. There will always be a need for enforcement, intelligence sharing, and most other aspects of the homeland security enterprise. However, the reduced demand for service may also result in reduced levels of funding or redistribution of funding from federal to local initiatives, a proposition that few agencies appreciate. This may also be true for those receiving funding from the federal government that is not community-based, as a change in strategy may interfere with their funding streams. This concern is already being realized and managed through existing grant programs such as the Building Neighborhood Capacity grant program from OJJDP that required applicants to form cross-sector partnerships that planned to jointly improve underserved census tracts.²⁴⁹

A strong opposition for this process could come from civil libertarians. They may be able to argue that the Rising System could lead communities to conduct “witch-hunts” for suspects, especially those who residents may want to ostracize for reasons other than public safety. The judiciary would need to be properly briefed on the process, and help create safeguards to prevent relationships from being exploited in this manner. There could also be concerns regarding domestic intelligence gathering because of the bi-directional information flow. Some of these concerns may be ameliorated through an open engagement process, though some parties may never be completely satisfied with the results.

²⁴⁹ United States Department of Justice, “Bureau of Justice Assistance – Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative (NRI),” accessed July 14, 2012.

E. ADVANTAGES OF A RISING SYSTEM

In a successful implementation, governments at all levels would establish new relationships in communities where they previously had little access. These relationships would inform civil servants and elected officials in a way that would make government more responsive to citizens' needs. While quantitative data analysis can provide a baseline for certain factors in a community, it does not determine which issues are the most significant to the everyday lives of residents. In addition to governments being more responsive, communities would build capacity for assuring internal public safety; partnerships would develop sustainable solutions to local problems that produce opportunities for residents; governments would enhance intelligence capabilities; and governments would utilize resources more efficiently by gaining a better understanding of where funding is needed most. The Rising System could lead governments to operate smarter, faster, and better:

Smarter Government—The Rising System would encourage agency representatives to meet regularly to identify overlapping problems and develop and deliver collaborative solutions to long-term, complex issues. As officials adapt to serving residents in this manner, the Rising System would create a means for right-sizing resources as well as agency structures.

Faster Government—By improving front-line coordination among officials, service delivery may become more efficient. As the system progresses, integration of technology systems would facilitate information-sharing, joint planning, and delivery of services.

Better Government—The Rising System would shift the determination for success from strictly agency-based measures to actual outcomes seen in focus communities. The Rising System would create a mechanism for regional accountability for public safety, and help define the public safety role of organizations outside of the traditional HS field. On an external level, the Rising System would reform the governments' relationship with focus communities by fostering involvement by local groups to help continue progress.

While a successful implementation would bring many positive aspects, the relationship developed between the government and the community should also involve a degree of debate. Discussion surrounding strategies, perceptions, and messaging is a healthy exercise that can lead to the improvement of government operations. This is particularly true in the case of the “narrative” that the 9/11 Commission suggested is needed to counter recruitment efforts by terrorist organizations.²⁵⁰ The debate could aid in conveying the perspective of the U.S. government in vulnerable communities, as discussed in Section B of this chapter.

F. POTENTIAL HAZARDS

As a program that delivers resources to particular communities, a significant criticism of the Rising System would likely be its restrictions. With Philadelphia’s outreach, community members have thrived on the notion that they are receiving specialized focus and attention from the city government. The resources that the City of Philadelphia is able to bring to participating neighborhoods have been incredibly popular with residents, politicians, and the media. Some of Philadelphia’s communities that have not been selected, however, have occasionally become irritated at what they perceive as an inequitable amount of attention paid to selected neighborhoods. The most frequent criticism of PhillyRising to date is that it is not operating in enough neighborhoods.²⁵¹ Focused attention from other levels of government would likely receive the same criticism, but with limited resources, a needs-based approach is necessary.

The physical restriction on the number of communities implies a series of other hazards that the Rising System would need to address. First, the use of agencies and specialized resources would need to be executed in a way that does not impact the normal delivery of other government services. While some communities may require more outreach than others, none should sacrifice their basic levels of government service.

²⁵⁰ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*.

²⁵¹ Information provided by the City of Philadelphia Managing Director’s Office.

In a similar vein, the program's practitioners would need to ensure that engagement activities do not cause more grievances. This is the case both with the focused communities, as Fishman warned,²⁵² as well as other communities not at the heart of the Rising System. The System should not create an environment where communities threaten extremism in order to receive the program's benefits. In a related vein, the process of selecting neighborhoods would necessarily exclude many communities, which could cause resentment. Prioritizing too many areas would eliminate the true prioritization of any.

Another potential downside to this type of focused outreach is elevating the status of certain types of groups. Opponents of the program could argue that certain groups, particularly those that pose threats, should not have access to policymakers that ordinary citizens might not. As the case study of the United Kingdom demonstrated, there is also a danger of supporting "questionable" groups during an engagement process. After some initial criticism for supporting groups that made questionable statements (although they had tremendous access to the focus community), British leadership made an adjustment to not work with groups that do not share the same values as the majority of British citizens.²⁵³ Determining the groups that have leverage in American communities, and finding politically acceptable ways to communicate with or support them can be another potential hazard.

The focused communities, however, are in a unique position to help the government reform operations. If government maintains relationships and service levels with communities outside of the Rising System through methods such as community policing, changes to government operations can incorporate information from communities with a good relationship with the government, and still conduct focused outreach to those who may feel alienated. Still, the ability for some local leaders to provide information that gets their constituents focused attention may serve to elevate their social standing.

²⁵² Fishman and Lebovich, "Countering Domestic Radicalization."

²⁵³ United Kingdom, *Prevent Strategy*.

The government would also need to be wary of how direct and obvious ties are to communities that participate in the Rising System. Coordinators must take precautions to ensure that participating groups are not seen by their peers as puppets of the government. This could undermine the credibility of the process, and may do more damage to the participating community than good. This problem would be enhanced if financial considerations were made part of the process. Direct payments could be viewed as a form of bribery, and groups seen in this light would likely lose touch with their constituencies and compromise the entire Rising System in the eyes of members of more stable neighborhoods.

Linking a service connection to the group, however, may lead to the opposite effect. In the Hartranft community of Eastern North Philadelphia, stakeholders who participated in the PhillyRising process were widely seen as gaining power.²⁵⁴ Because they did not receive any direct financial compensation, and were able to advance their priorities for neighborhood progress, they reinforced their position as local leaders. They were seen as being able to manipulate government to conform to the neighborhood's agenda instead of that of the government.

G. POTENTIAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE RISING SYSTEM

In a system with many levels of governments and agencies, a predictable early point of friction involves determining who makes the decision to focus on a particular community. While no structure for decision-making in this type of setting would be beyond criticism, a joint approach involving several perspectives stands a chance of producing a balanced process.

For the Rising System, a team of local and federal representatives probably makes the most sense to determine areas of focus. Robert Deardorff's ROOCC, and the other federal organizational frameworks described earlier, could provide a logical framework to make these decisions. The federal representatives would provide intelligence and perspectives about communities they believe have either a particular vulnerability to

²⁵⁴ Information provided by the City of Philadelphia Managing Director's Office.

radicalization or another statistical anomaly that causes concern. The local representatives would provide perspective about activity in selected communities, including crime trends, levels of trust, and social makeup of the area. The team would compile this information to decide which areas are in most urgent need of outreach, and how that process should begin. A rubric could be developed to analyze communities consistently, but it would need to incorporate the flexibility to prioritize work as warranted by changing conditions. Confidentiality of at least some the reasons for selection would be important to avoid extremist reactions by those who may take violent actions against communities they see as housing threats.

The Rising System would also need to develop a strategy for communities that Nolan, Conti, and McDevitt would describe as “Anomic.”²⁵⁵ While there is information about several tactics for working in communities with at least relatively organized internal dynamics, the review failed to define any strategy for communities that do not have a strong system of local organizations. Each of the documents reviewed, with the exception of the Nolan article²⁵⁶ and Home Office Online Report,²⁵⁷ either described communities that were successful at self-organization, or touted the benefits of engagement based on the assumption that communities had strong local groups. A more thorough analysis of the tactics used by Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and the United Kingdom may produce some examples, as each serves some communities that fit this description. To develop a strategy that secures the goals of the homeland security enterprise, this would need to be addressed, as those “forgotten” communities may be the most attractive destinations for those that pose the greatest threats.

Opponents of the Rising System may also question why a new system needs to be developed when community policing systems across the U.S. are already proving to be successful. While this may be true, the policing strategies alone are not enough. This is

²⁵⁵ Nolan et al., “Situational Policing.”

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Camina, *Understanding and Engaging Deprived Communities*.

evidenced by the “broken windows” theory²⁵⁸ that underscores much of current community policing efforts. The theory argues that by addressing issues of social disorder beyond the scope of policing tactics, neighborhoods can ultimately become safer than through policing alone. The need can also be seen in the structure of operations in several of the case studies, as entities outside of law enforcement are frequently used to abate conditions that may be pursuant to criminal acts.

Additionally, police officers are not specialists in many of the fields that quality of life concerns encompass. For instance, Philadelphia's police officers do not have the legal authority (or training) to formally take action on abandoned buildings aside from reporting them. Those operations are handled by the City's Department of Licenses and Inspections.²⁵⁹ Trained professionals are better informed and equipped to make the determination when properties should be cleaned, sealed, and demolished. If a vacant property is identified by the community as a bastion for crime, the Rising System would call for the police to handle the aspects directly related to offenses, while relying on partner organizations and agencies to assist in addressing the physical environment that is housing the issues.

This would operate in a similar way (in the Rising System) when communities desire high-level policy changes. The police may collect the information, but they would not ultimately make specific policy changes. Quite simply, the police cannot do everything.

The police need support in their efforts to bridge disaffected communities and their government. The Rising System would serve to specifically address this concern. Agencies that may not have a traditional role in homeland would be brought into the process. The agency representatives would listen to both the community and the police, and work together to determine appropriate measures to address grievances. This holistic approach to community support and capacity building can both foster trust and make all programs involved more efficient and effective.

²⁵⁸ George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, “Broken Windows,” *The Atlantic* (March 1982).

²⁵⁹ Information provided by the City of Philadelphia Managing Director’s Office.

As agencies outside of the police department are brought into a community engagement process, it would test their ability to work among cultural groups that they may not otherwise have contacted. In 2011, the Philadelphia Fire Commissioner described a situation where a particular immigrant ethnic community refused to allow his firefighters to install free smoke alarms, because they did not trust the government, primarily due to experiences in their native countries.²⁶⁰ Agencies would need to be prepared to address such concerns, as they would likely be repeated as outreach expands.

H. PROGRAM EVALUATION

There are many statistics that could be used to determine the success or failure of the Rising System, and each stakeholder would likely have their own metrics. Agencies such as the FBI, for instance, may evaluate success by the number of tips received from the focus community, or the number of plots they are able to disrupt due to such information. The local police department could measure success by the change in crime rate for the focus community, as is the case for the Philadelphia Police Department's evaluation of PhillyRising.²⁶¹ Residents or members of the community may determine success by their perception of their quality of life, success of their children, or something that may need to be determined in a survey.

There are some factors that may be useful for all stakeholders to evaluate. The first is the number of potential recruits who are dissuaded from taking an extremist path. The number of people stopped shows that the program is credible and effective, and benefits every group involved. It is a statistic that would also impact almost all of the others mentioned—if FBI does not have to disrupt a plot, no crime was committed, and the community can feel safer having that person as a productive member of society, rather than a fringe element determined to attack it. A principal difficulty may come in measuring this number beyond those affected by direct intervention.

²⁶⁰ Philadelphia Fire Commissioner Lloyd Ayers, as presented at *PhillyStat Outcomes Meeting*, July 6, 2011.

²⁶¹ Information provided by the City of Philadelphia Managing Director's Office.

The Rising System would also track changes to the relationship between community members and agencies. This may be measured by factors such as increases in the community's faith that their requests will not only be heard, but completed to the greatest extent possible. These responses, though difficult to quantify, would determine an initial acceptance of the Rising System by the local community. Their acceptance is absolutely necessary for the positive changes in the focus area to occur and continue.

Additional metrics analyzed in focus communities should include both short- and long-term outcomes. Short-term outcomes may include: local perception of safety, amount of physical disorder/blight, level of community engagement/pride, and degree of success of coordination among agencies. Long-term outcomes may include: overall status of quality of life, health status, economic conditions, level of self-sufficiency achieved by communities, and increases in service efficiencies.

Ultimately, a successful neighborhood would be one where the Rising System's coordinated approach is no longer needed—the community members would have taken over the process themselves, and developed relationships with the government that no longer require a central coordinator.

V. CONCLUSION

A. FINDINGS

This thesis focused on the following research question: How can homeland security practitioners leverage what is known about local citizen engagement to improve federal outreach in a way that makes communities safer? To determine how this may be accomplished, five subquestions were answered to provide a baseline of understanding:

1. How can engagement be used to build resilience and trust?

The initial research (found in the literature review) focused on determining the effectiveness of community engagement as a public safety tool. The research concluded that for a variety of reasons, engaging communities can make them more resilient, both from a public safety and homeland security perspective. Communities that have a higher degree of self-efficacy and trust of their government have demonstrated the ability to recover more quickly from natural and human-initiated disasters. A high degree of trust is lacking in many U.S. communities, particularly those with chronic conditions of crime and disorder. Simple outreach tactics, such as an increase in the number of positive, professional interactions with government employees, may help build trust with these communities, and improve their resilience. The ability to build social trust was determined to be an essential characteristic of successful engagement programs, and local government officials have generally been able to establish trust more readily than their federal counterparts.

2. With limited resources, engagement strategies must be focused on areas where they will have the most significant impact. How can the government identify areas that are high-risk for crime or terrorism?

The case studies in Chapter III analyzed engagement programs that defined their communities differently, and that spread resources to different numbers of communities. Programs in Chicago and the United Kingdom, for instance, had an egalitarian approach

to distributing their resources. Philadelphia and Los Angeles, however, directed their resources at more focused audiences. In each case, the definition of the “community” to be engaged played a prominent role in decided how resources are allocated. Due to the diverse nature of communities and threats across the U.S., local leaders are in a strong position to determine which criteria will be most useful in determining a resource allocation strategy. No single strategy is likely to work in every area.

3. *What specialties or resources are needed to conduct an effective engagement process?*

The research for this thesis showed that very few specialty resources are needed for an effective engagement process. The most consistent resource in successful programs across the case studies was personnel dedicated to conducting outreach. The research showed that the methods by which the outreach is conducted have a stronger impact on the outcome than the use of any specific resources. Three qualities of the outreach methods were particularly important in determining each program’s degree of success: How they defined the community to be engaged, the tactics they used to engage residents, and how they allocate funding and resources.

4. *What aspects of engagement might help counter the terrorist narrative preventing individuals from becoming involved in terrorist organizations?*

Conducted properly, engagement can help the U.S. address the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation to counter the terrorist narrative.²⁶² Bringing members of at-risk communities into a discussion with government entities could provide a forum where subject matter experts can help refine how messages are conveyed to communities. As is the case with deradicalization strategies, the use of respected members of focus communities to convey a message could increase the chances of an engagement program’s success. These practices may lead to closer ties between the community and the government. Countering extremist and criminal ideology may help eliminate the flow of recruits to criminal organizations, which may contribute to their demise.

²⁶² National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*.

5. *How can engagement change the behavior of potentially dangerous individuals?*

Support for changing the behavior of individuals came primarily from the Procedural Justice School of Psychology. Procedural Justice focuses on the notion that the perception of fairness of a procedure or system is more important to a participant than the outcome of that process. A sense of unfairness can lead to feelings of alienation, which, as articulated by Dr. Fathali Moghaddam, is a first step down a path that could ultimately lead to terrorism. An open, participatory engagement process, however, could work to promote the perception of a system (or government) as being fairer, and may cause citizens to be less likely to become a threat.

How can homeland security practitioners leverage what is known about local citizen engagement to improve federal outreach in a way that makes communities safer?

The succinct answer to the overarching research question is that the federal government should work with existing community engagement programs, established by local governments, to improve federal outreach. While the research determined a series of more nuanced characteristics to increase the effectiveness of the engagement, the basic recommendation is to develop a federal point of contact to work with local engagement systems. A detailed plan for one way this may accomplished is proposed in this thesis as “the Rising System,” a domestic coordination and engagement system.

The Problem Space (found in Chapter I) portion of this thesis outlined the ambiguity of existing federal guidance on engagement and the role of the American public in homeland security. The Rising System provides a tangible method for clarifying that guidance. The goal of empowering citizens to be more responsible for their safety may be accomplished through concerted outreach done through local officials. Any increase in trust may also improve safety/security as well as quality of life. In short, the Rising System can help the federal government realize its goals for citizen engagement by supporting existing local outreach strategies.

B. MORE QUESTIONS TO ANSWER

While the structure of the Rising System is designed to incorporate many of the positive qualities of effective engagement from the literature review and case studies, there are several aspects to developing a federal engagement structure that warrant further review. While the basic premise of the engagement is recommended to be a federal entity that coordinates federal engagement actions and connects with local engagement programs, identification of which federal agency proves the coordination and liaison is less clear. The conclusions in this thesis recommend either the implementation of Brad Deardorff's Regional Outreach and Operations Coordination Center (ROOCC) concept or the use of the U.S. Attorney's Office, but there are likely other options that could also present reasonable, effective solutions.

The portion of this thesis that requires the most future research is creating a methodology for determining which characteristics of communities make them of particular interest to the security community at the national level. Understanding that the federal government does not have an unlimited supply of funding, outreach would need to be concentrated on specific areas. Each of the cases studied here uses different criteria to determine the focus of their outreach, and the federal government would need to determine criteria as well. The outline of the Rising System outlines several criteria that could help to make the selection process more palatable to communities throughout the U.S. Ultimately, this system will likely undergo the least criticism if it is done in an objective manner as possible. The development of such a formula could produce a fascinating discussion with useful research regarding trends in public safety and homeland security threats.

C. NEXT STEPS

The central tenants of this thesis argue that: community engagement can be effective in making communities safer; and the U.S. federal government can pursue many options to improve its outreach to local American communities, particularly by working with existing local government programs already in place. These tenants form the basis

for the Rising System, a mechanism for federal engagement that would work to build trust among various levels of government and the residents they serve.

To realize the Rising System, support would first be needed at the federal level. At least one agency (though preferably a partnership of several agencies) would need to take the lead in experimenting with an existing local government outreach program. While the cases studied in this thesis provide some examples of effective programs, other municipalities may also provide suitable test grounds. Successful implementation of a test case, particularly with an agency related to the public safety or homeland security fields, could make the case for expansion, and ultimately prompt an addendum to federal documents that outlines a federal structure for accountability for citizen engagement.

The U.S. has already seen that existing measures to disrupt terrorist/public safety activities are not always successful. While tactical operations have reached high levels of performance, they rely on the premise of detecting a threat before it is executed. Because knowledge is inherently limited, this strategy cannot always be successful. However, by developing a strategy that prevents at least some plots from reaching the point of execution, public safety officials may become more effective by focusing resources on a smaller number of threats. Violent crime and terrorist activities in the U.S. may never end, but by bringing more people into the government's decision-making process, and by providing more opportunities to those who may otherwise slip between the cracks, the U.S. may be able to improve the standing of its most vulnerable populations.

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